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THE EFFECT OF COGNITIVE LOAD ON LIARS AND TRUTH TELLERS: EXPLORING 
THE MODERATING IMPACT OF WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY  
by 
Sarah Jordan 
Adviser: Maria Hartwig 
Two studies are presented. The purpose of the first study is to examine the moderating impact of 
working memory capacity (WMC) on the cognitive load produced by both the type of statement 
a person is making and the manner in which the person is interviewed in a mock crime scenario. 
The moderating impact of suspects’ WMC (measured using the automated operation span task) 
on this process was also assessed. Suspects were instructed to tell the truth, a relatively easy lie, 
or a more difficult lie. Suspects were then interviewed in a relatively easy manner, a moderately 
more difficult manner, or a very difficult manner. The purpose of the second study is to examine 
how the factors of the first study affected observers’ judgments of the suspects. Observers were 
asked to either directly assess the veracity of the suspects, or indirectly assess it by observing the 
suspects’ experienced cognitive load. The results overall did not support the hypotheses and 
demonstrated that deception was not cognitively more difficult from telling the truth and that the 
use of cognitive load was not helpful in the process of accurately determining the guilt or 
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THE EFFECT OF COGNITIVE LOAD ON LIARS AND TRUTH TELLERS: EXPLORING  
 
THE MODERATING IMPACT OF WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY 
 
Cognitive load tasks are activities that put a person under mental strain due to the need to 
focus attention, suppress unnecessary or competing information, and switch attention between 
multiple tasks (Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003). Working memory (WM) is the ability to use 
focused attention and cognitive effort to accomplish goals (Engle, Kane, & Tulhoski, 1999). 
Tasks that require attention and concentration will use WM (Engle et al., 1999). Therefore one’s 
ability to cope with cognitive load tasks will closely depend on one’s capacity for WM. 
Individuals vary in their working memory capacity (WMC), where some have a greater capacity 
for attention and concentration than others. Individuals with a greater WMC are better able to 
successfully complete tasks that induce cognitive load (Blalock & McCabe, 2011). Research 
indicates that lying is a task that requires more WM compared to telling the truth (Gombos, 
2006). Logically then, individuals’ WMC should dictate how well they are be able to lie. This is 
the question addressed in the current research: Does WMC moderate the cues to cognitive load 
that are exhibited by people under differing levels of cognitive load tasks? And does this then 
translate into cues for deception that lead to accurate lie detection accuracy?  
The importance in answering these questions lies in developing a better understanding of 
the cognitive nature of deception and also in developing more accurate lie detection methods. 
The almost global finding in the field of deception detection is that accuracy in detecting lies and 
truths is close to the accuracy one would expect from chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 
2008) and not many techniques are capable of greatly altering these numbers (Frank & Feeley, 
2003). More successful techniques and understandings of deception seem to have relied on 
looking at deception in terms of a cognitive activity, such as examining differences in how liars 
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and truth tellers think (e.g. Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005). The current research 
seeks to extend this vein of understanding deception as a cognitive process by examining how it 
is affected by WMC. Studying the role of WMC will lead to a better understanding of the degree 
to which deception is governed by cognitive control mechanisms, and also the degree to which 
the process of deception can be interrupted or exploited by cognitive means (i.e. better methods 
of lie detection).  
The current research is based in the cognitive load method of lie detection (Vrij, Granhag, 
Mann, & Leal, 2011), which posits that lying is cognitively demanding and is a primarily 
cognitive activity. Lying is a more cognitively effortful activity than telling the truth because 
lying requires suppressing truthful information, planning a lie to tell, and telling that lie in a 
believable way, among other cognitive tasks. Comparatively, telling the truth primarily requires 
recall of information. Previous research shows that liars display some behaviors which indicate 
that they are experiencing cognitive load (e.g. Leal, Vrij, Fisher, & van Hoff, 2008). When liars 
and truth tellers are placed under extra cognitive load, such behaviors become more pronounced 
in liars compared to truth tellers (Vrij et al., 2008). Research also indicates that WMC moderates 
performance on tasks of cognitive load (Engle et al., 1999). Based on this, several research 
questions are posed: Will WMC moderate the degree to which liars and truth tellers display cues 
to cognitive load? Will WMC affect the ability of liars and truth tellers to cope with external load 
during a deception detection interview? Can WMC be used as an individual difference variable 
to help accurately assess deception?  
To better understand these questions, I will review the relevant literature. First, I will 
provide an overview of the current issues and problems in deception detection. Next, I will 
provide a review of the WMC literature, with a specific focus on how WM controls the cognitive 
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processes theorized to be associated with deception. Then I will discuss the intersection of the 
literature of these two ideas in order to better understand the cognitive nature of deception, 
specifically with regard to the cognitive differences between liars and truth tellers. I conclude 
this overview of the literature with a discussion of the cognitive load approach to lie detection, 
and how this can be used as a tool to better detect deception.  
Deception Detection 
The importance and state of the deception detection field. Lie judgments—decisions 
about a person’s or statement’s truthfulness or deceit—are important in many settings, including 
security and law enforcement fields. For example, police investigators need to accurately assess 
whether the information they are receiving from a witness or a suspect is truthful. In many cases 
there will be no physical evidence available, and police will have to rely on the statements of the 
victims and suspects.  
There is much evidence in the deception literature that lie detection accuracy is poor. 
Bond and DePaulo (2006) meta-analyzed the deception judgments from 206 published and 
unpublished studies. Overall accuracy was 54%.  In another meta-analysis, Bond and DePaulo 
(2008) examined the individual differences in lie detection and found that there was little 
variation in individuals’ ability aside from what would be expected by statistical error variance. 
Instead, deception judgments seemed to be driven by the credibility of the liar or truth teller, not 
the skill of the judge. Bond and DePaulo (2006) also examined the impact of being an expert, 
interacting with the target, and being exposed to the target’s baseline behavior. None of these 
factors impacted variance in accuracy or individual ability. As there is a very stable finding of 
54% accuracy with very little deviation across studies, and since 50% accuracy would be 
expected by guessing alone, it is fair to conclude that human lie detection accuracy is poor. 
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Police officers are highly confident in their ability to detect deception (Kassin et al., 2007), yet 
research consistently demonstrates that their accuracy in doing so is also rather poor, being only 
a little better than chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008).  
This combination of poor accuracy and high confidence can lead to dangerous 
consequences (O’Brien, 2009). Believing a person is lying can lead to the (mistaken) conclusion 
that he or she is guilty of a crime, such that later exonerating evidence is viewed as less reliable 
or credible (Ask & Granhag, 2007). It can also lead to the use of coercive interview methods that 
could elicit false and damaging statements (Kassin, 2005). Alternately, incorrectly believing the 
denials of a guilty person mistakenly shifts the focus of the investigators, such that the case may 
not be closed, a guilty and/or dangerous person escapes justice, and/or an innocent individual 
may be identified as the culprit.  
It is important then to have reliable and accurate methods of lie detection, as currently lie 
detection accuracy is poor. Yet lie detection training does not seem to offer much improvement. 
In a meta-analysis of 11 published training studies, Frank and Feeley (2003) found that there was 
at best a small gain, 4%, from training. They also found a lack of consistency in the findings, 
where some evidenced null or even negative effects from training (e.g. Kassin & Fong, 1999; 
Kohnken, 1987).  
There are many reasons why there are not many accurate lie detection techniques and 
why lie detection in general is very poor. In the next section, I review the research on some of 
the reasons there are problems in detecting deception.  
Problems in detecting deception. Researchers have found that, across countries and 
cultures, people report relying on gaze aversion as a cue to deception and believe that liars are 
more likely to shift their posture, engage in self-touching behaviors, and appear nervous (Global 
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Deception Research Team, 2006). Law enforcement personnel hold similar beliefs (Strömwall & 
Granhag, 2003; Vrij, Akehurst, & Knight, 2006; Vrij & Semin, 1996). The basis for relying on 
these cues stems from the idea that lying is an emotionally laden process, in which people feel 
guilty for lying and fearful that their lies will be discovered. Many popular lie detection 
techniques therefore predict that liars will exhibit signs of nervousness (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 
1988; Frank & Ekman, 1997; Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013). However, reliance on such 
cues does not appear to have any benefit for detecting deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
DePaulo et al., 2003), but rather helps people at better discerning emotion (Matsumoto & 
Hwang, 2011; Russell, Chu, & Phillips, 2006).   
One problem with the emotional understanding of deception is that it assumes that there 
is anxiety associated only with deception (Ekman, 1985); however there are reasons for people 
telling the truth to also feel anxiety. For example, they may fear being wrongly accused of lying 
or even of committing a crime, thus leading to the exhibition of the nervous behaviors associated 
with deception. Additionally, it seems that people lie quite frequently and do not experience 
much anxiety in doing so. DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996) conducted a 
diary study in which participants recorded all of their social interactions for a week and also 
when they lied. They found that participants lied in about 20-30% of their social interactions. 
The types of lies told were most frequently outright lies and primarily told for self-centered 
reasons, such as preserving self-esteem. Overall, participants reported low levels of planning for 
the lie, told not very serious lies, and reported a high rate of others believing their lies. 
Participants reported feeling low levels of distress before, during, and after the lie. Whether the 
lie is big or small then, there is evidence to suggest that liars and truth tellers will experience and 
exhibit similar levels of anxiety, thus displaying indistinguishable patterns of nervous behavior.  
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Another problem with the anxiety based theory of deception is that it relies on the 
exhibition of emotions in a person’s nonverbal behavior, yet people have a lot of practice at 
monitoring and controlling their nonverbal behavior (DePaulo et al., 1996). People need to fit in 
with their social groups and communities and are naturally motivated to present themselves well 
to others, including in their nonverbal behavior (DePaulo, 1992). Indeed, people oftentimes 
continue to monitor these behaviors even when they are alone. DePaulo (1992) also found that 
people are even better at expressing falsely experienced emotions than genuinely felt emotions. 
Those who are putting forth false impressions will make an extra effort to be clear and 
unambiguous about the emotion that they are ‘feeling’. Even in situations where there is no overt 
deception or need to lie, people will still monitor their behavior in order to portray themselves in 
a positive light. Thus, it seems that people have a lot of practice at controlling their nonverbal 
behavior and are good at using their nonverbal behavior to deceive.  
Another problem in lie detection accuracy is the fact that there are few reliable cues to 
deception. DePaulo et al. (2003) analyzed over 150 cues, of which they found that most were not 
related to deception and a few were weakly related. Hartwig and Bond (2011) used a lens model 
to attempt to explain lack of accuracy in deception judgments. The lens model compares the cues 
being exhibited by those telling deceptive and truthful statements with the cues being used by 
those judging the statements and the degree to which these overlap. Their results suggest that the 
primary reason for inaccuracy in lie detection is the scarcity of cues to deception.  
It seems then that the best method of detecting deception is not training people to spot 
unreliable or difficult to recognize cues, but rather to create situations and methods that will 
amplify and emphasize the already existing differences between liars and truth tellers. As I will 
discuss later, there is some promise in considering an approach which relies on exploiting the 
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cognitive differences between liars and truth tellers. Before I discuss this approach, it is 
important to provide a framework for understanding the cognitive nature of deception. To this 
end, I next review the literature regarding the field of WM and WMC and will later link these 
concepts to the process of deception.  
Working Memory and Working Memory Capacity  
Defining and understanding working memory. A classic definition of WM is that it is 
a three part system consisting primarily of the central executive, which controls attention and 
allocates resources to the domain-specific visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop 
(Baddeley, 1992). However, many argue that the essence of working memory is the domain-
general ability to focus attention, which is supported by other domain specific knowledge bases 
(Engle, 2001; Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 1992; Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2004). Engle 
(2001) argues that there is not a perfect correlation between the many tasks measuring a person’s 
WM ability because all of the tasks utilize different domain-specific knowledge bases. WM is 
frequently measured using span tasks, which are dual tasks that require a person to complete one 
task while simultaneously remembering a string of letters or words that he or she must later 
recall in the correct order (Conway et al., 2005). These tasks involve different domain skills, 
such as math (operational span) or reading (reading span). The person might score better on the 
reading span task than on the operational span task because he or she has differing ability in 
these domains. The overlap among the tests is the measure of the central executive component, 
because all of these tasks require the person to maintain controlled attention to remember the 
relevant information in the face of the interference of the secondary task.  
Based on this research, it appears that WM is primarily domain-general mental effort and 
attention that is applied in the face of interference and distraction. Those activities that will 
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require mental effort and attention are controlled by WM. Those cognitive processes which could 
be considered automatic and that do not require concentration are not controlled by WM 
(Passingham, 1996; Tuholski, Engle, & Babylis, 2001). As previously stated, people differ in 
their WMC. WMC is the amount of WM possessed by an individual and is a stable trait (Engle et 
al., 1999). WMC has been shown to moderate many psychological phenomena, such as reading 
skill (Engle et al., 1999) and language comprehension (Just & Carpenter, 1992). Barrett, Tugade, 
and Engle (2004) hypothesize that WMC likely also moderates other psychological phenomena 
as well. For example, they posit that those with lower WMC may be more likely to make the 
fundamental attribution error or exhibit stereotype behavior when interference or distraction is 
present. WMC is ubiquitous in affecting people’s behavior. This is likely because WM governs 
the basic cognitive activities involved in both large and small tasks. In the next section, I review 
how WMC moderates several of these basic cognitive activities.  
Evidence of working memory control of cognitive activity. It is useful to understand 
the role of WM in cognitive functions by looking specifically at how such functions are 
moderated by WMC. We know that WM must be involved in an activity if those with more WM 
perform better at the task than those with less. Rosen and Engle (1998) provide evidence that 
WM is related to the suppression and inhibition of information. They had participants learn pairs 
of words that and then later changed the word pairings. They asked participants to recall the 
original word pairings, and found that those with higher WMC were more accurate in their recall 
of the original pairing than those with lower WMC.  
Those with higher WMC also demonstrated something called negative priming, where 
information is more difficult to recall if it has previously been suppressed (Conway, Tuholski, 
Shisler, & Engle, 1999; Engle, Conway, Tuholski, & Shisler, 1995). Participants with higher 
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WMC in the Rosen and Engle (1998) study had slower recall times on later learned pairings of 
the word, while those with low WMC had faster recall times. This is because participants were 
first asked to recall the original pairings, so the other word pairings were deemed irrelevant and 
suppressed. However, when these participants were later asked to recall the other learned pairs, 
they found this to be more difficult because they had suppressed these word pairings. This is 
evidence that those higher in WM have better success at actively suppressing information when 
it is irrelevant (Conway et al., 1999; Engle et al., 1995).  
WM is also related to the ability cope with distracting information and tasks. Conway, 
Cowan, and Bunting (2001) had participants complete a dichotic listening task where two 
different messages were presented simultaneously, one in each ear. Participants had to report the 
information from one of the messages and ignore the information from the other. At some point, 
the participant’s name was presented in the irrelevant message. Those with low WMC were more 
likely to hear their name in the irrelevant message, indicating that they were less able to ignore 
this distracter information. In a replication of this study, Colflesh and Conway (2007) 
forewarned participants that their name may be presented. Those with high WMC were better at 
both identifying their name in the irrelevant message and had fewer errors in attending to the 
relevant message presented in the other ear. 
WM is also linked to the ability to cope with automatic responses. This was examined by 
Kane, Bleckley, Conway, and Engle (2001) using prosaccade and antisaccade tasks. In both tasks 
a mark is flashed on a screen being viewed by participants, and the mark signifies that the target 
will soon be presented to be identified. In prosaccade, this mark indicates that the target will 
appear where the mark flashes. In antisaccade, the mark indicates that the target will appear on 
the opposite side of the screen, and thus participants have to shift their gaze to identify the target. 
THIRD DOCTORAL EXAMINATION                                                                                    10 
 
The flashing mark creates an automatic orienting response that serves participants well in the 
prosaccade task, but which must be actively fought against to succeed in the antisaccade task. 
Participants with high WMC had quicker reaction times in identifying targets in antisaccade 
trials than those with low WMC, but WMC had no effect on prosaccade trials. The stroop task—
reading color words in different color inks—also produces a similar automatic response 
(MacLeod, 1991), and a similar effect of WMC was found (Kane & Engle, 2003).  
Unsworth, Spillers, and Brewer (2010) demonstrated WM to be related to the 
maintenance of information in memory. Unsworth and Engle (2008) examined how WM is 
related both to maintaining and updating information in memory. Participants in their study were 
required to keep two separate counts for big objects and small objects. They varied the rates at 
which the count switched between objects. The higher the change frequency, the higher the 
cognitive effort associated with the task. Participants with high WMC had more accurate counts 
than those with low WMC, and this difference increased as the frequency of change increased, 
where the performance of low WMC participants decreased and that of participants with high 
WMC remained the same. This indicates that not only is WM involved in updating and 
maintaining information related to two separate tasks, but that those with higher WMC have an 
advantage at doing so as the tasks become more difficult.  
The research reviewed so far explains how WMC moderates basic cognitive activities. I 
will later relate how these cognitive activities relate to the process of deception and how 
therefore people with higher WMC will have an advantage when lying. In the next section, I 
discuss how WMC similarly moderates cognitive load (the amount of difficulty involved in the 
task). This will later be linked to how WMC likely moderates the cognitive load of deception.  
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Evidence of working memory in moderating cognitive load. WM is also related to the 
ability to handle cognitive load (Paas et al., 2003). Blalock and McCabe (2011) reviewed the 
research on proactive interference and its effects on span task performance. Recall that span 
tasks require a person to complete a series of simple math problems while simultaneously 
remembering a string of numbers or words (Conway et al., 2005). Blalock and McCabe (2011) 
concluded that individuals with higher WMC are better able to cope with interference because 
when interference is low, the performance of people with low WMC more closely resembles that 
of those with high WMC. Kane and Engle (2000) had participants remember word lists while 
simultaneously completing a simple or a complex finger tapping exercise. Participants with low 
WMC overall made more errors. Moreover, there was an interaction effect, such that when the 
more cognitively complex finger tapping exercise was being completed, those with low WMC 
were more likely to make errors than those with high WMC. These studies indicate that WM aids 
in completing tasks that are cognitively effortful. 
There is also evidence from the studies discussed in the previous section that high WMC 
helps people cope with cognitive load. For example, measures of WMC themselves require 
individuals to conduct two separate tasks simultaneously (Conway et al., 2005). In many studies 
(Colfesh & Conway, 2007; Conway et al., 2001; Kane & Engle, 2000; Unsworth & Engle, 
2008), multiple tasks were given to the participants. Completing more than one task that requires 
cognitive attention is likely cognitive demanding, a position which is supported by the fact that 
WMC moderated the ability of people to perform both tasks. Those with higher WMC performed 
the tasks better than those with lower WMC (Colfesh & Conway, 2007; Conway et al., 2001; 
Kane & Engle, 2000; Unsworth & Engle, 2008). 
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The evidence indicates that, as the difficulty of the task increases, the advantage of higher 
WMC in performance increases. For example, Conway et al. (2001) originally had participants 
listen to two separate messages and then inserted the name of the participant into the irrelevant 
message. In a later replication of this study, Colfesh and Conway (2007) increased the difficulty 
of this task by forewarning the participants and asking them to note when their name was said, 
thus forcing participants to also attend to the irrelevant message. In both instances, those with 
higher WMC were better able to successfully complete all the tasks required of them compared 
to those with lower WMC (Conway et al., 2001). Similarly, Unsworth and Engle (2008) had 
participants maintain two counts for two different types of objects and showed only one object at 
a time. They varied the frequency at which there was a switch over to a different type of object, 
with low, moderate, and high frequencies. As the switch frequency increased, the performance of 
those with higher WMC remained the same and the performance of those with lower WMC 
decreased.  
The research reviewed in this and the prior section demonstrates that WM is related to the 
ability to maintain and update information, focus on multiple tasks, cope with cognitively 
demanding tasks, and suppress and inhibit information. Moreover, these studies show that WMC 
moderates these processes to a degree that demonstrates that the more cognitive load imposed, 
the more detriment there is to those with lower WMC. As I propose in the current research, it is 
likely that WM is involved in the process of deception and that WMC will moderate deception in 
the same way it does other cognitive activities. This is based on the understanding that deception 
is likely to involve many different cognitive activities that require focused attention, and that 
deception is associated with a greater amount of inherent cognitive load. Next, I will describe the 
literature of applying a cognitive understanding to deception and deception detection.  
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The Cognitive Load of Deception 
A cognitive understanding of deception. Deception will likely involve forming the 
intent to lie (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003) and formulating the strategy of 
how to tell the lie (Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004). The strategy may involve determining the 
content of the lie (Spence et al., 2004; Walcyzk et al., 2003), monitoring the credulity of the 
person who is being deceived (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 1994; Schweitzer, 
Brodt, & Croson, 2002), and monitoring one’s own behavior (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1986; 
Johnson et al., 2004; Spence et al., 2004). Liars will also need to suppress the truthful 
information that they do not wish to reveal (Spence et al., 2004) and will need to be sure the lie 
makes sense in the context of previous information (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & 
Yurgerlun-Todd, 2003). Telling the truth on the other hand does not seem to involve as many 
cognitive processes. Truth tellers are more likely to tell the truth as it happened (Strömwall, 
Hartwig, & Granhag 2006), more likely to take their credibility for granted (Kassin, 2005), and 
feel they have no need to construct an alternative scenario to the truth (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007). Thus, it seems that the main cognitive task of the truth teller is to recall the 
truth from long-term memory, which is a relatively automatic cognitive process. Deception 
however, may involve completing multiple tasks and suppressing information, all of which 
require mental effort and focused attention, which, as I previously discussed, is the domain of 
WM (Engle et al., 1999).  
Cognitive neurological indicators of deception. The cognitive effort of deception is 
supported by many functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. Several researchers 
have indicated that the main regions of the brain that are reliably associated with deception tend 
to be located in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), while there are no brain areas that are associated 
THIRD DOCTORAL EXAMINATION                                                                                    14 
 
with truth telling, indicating that telling the truth represents a baseline state (Abe, 2011; Kozel, 
Padgett, & George, 2004; Spence et al., 2004). The content of the lies does not seem to change 
this basic finding. Langleben et al. (2002) performed an fMRI examination of personally 
irrelevant deception in which participants responded truthfully to holding one card or deceptively 
to holding another card. Lie responses, compared to truthful responses, had greater activity in the 
frontal and prefrontal cortex. There was no greater activation in the brain when telling the truth 
compared to a lie. These findings were replicated in studies examining emotionally valanced lies 
(Ito et al., 2011), spontaneous and memorized lies (Ganis et al., 2003), and malingering (Lee et 
al., 2002).  
The results of these studies consistently show that telling the truth is a baseline behavior 
while deception involves more activity in the PFC. The areas associated with deception are also 
areas associated with the functions of WM, specifically those of planning, suppression and 
inhibition, and coping with response competition, though there is very little research on the 
specific cognitive processes involved in deception at the neurological level (Johnson et al., 2004; 
Spence et al., 2004). In the next section, I review the literature studying the cognitive nature of 
deception using behavioral cues that indicate cognitive difficulty.  
Cognitively based behavioral cues to deception. Masip, Sporer, Garrido, and Herrero 
(2005) reviewed several studies examining the reality monitoring approach, an interview method 
that attempts to distinguish truthful from deceptive eyewitness statements. This approach is 
based on basic memory research and attempts to distinguish true memories from fabricated 
memories, where truthful memories should be based on external events that are recalled, and 
deceptive memories will be based on imagination. Essentially, fabricated memories should rely 
more on processes that require cognitive effort compared to truthful memories. Masip et al. 
THIRD DOCTORAL EXAMINATION                                                                                    15 
 
(2005) found in their literature review that visual, auditory, and contextual details are more likely 
to be present in truthful compared to deceptive statements. However, the number of cognitive 
operations was not very reliable, where sometimes they were found more in deceptive 
statements, and sometimes more in truthful statements. Overall, these findings indicate that 
truthful individuals rely more on recall from memory, as they have more details present in their 
statements. 
Sporer and Schwandt (2006) conducted a meta-analysis examining paraverbal cues (cues 
derived from the vocal aspects of a person’s statement, such as pitch and speech rate) that 
differentiate deception and truthfulness. As with Masip et al. (2005)'s review, Sporer and 
Schwandt (2006) found that many of the cues were affected by moderator variables, such as 
preparation. In general, deceptive statements had longer response delays and more speech errors 
and were shorter, though these effect sizes were somewhat small. This is in line with the 
cognitive model of deception, where a longer response delay and more speech errors indicate 
that deceptive individuals are relying less on automatic recall of a memory, and are focused more 
on thinking and self-monitoring.  
There are also physiological indications of deception that signify greater cognition. Leal 
et al. (2008) found that deception and cognitive load were both associated with less skin 
conductance. Leal and Vrij (2008) found that deception was also associated with the cognitive 
load indicator of decreased eye blinks. This was also found to be the case in a study by Mann, 
Vrij, and Bull (2002), which also found that deceptive suspects exhibited fewer arm and finger 
movements as well. As with these cues, it seems in general that cognitive load is associated with 
less overall body activity (Vrij et al., 2008), as attention is being shifted to the demanding mental 
task at hand.  
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From this point forward I refer to these cues to deception that are associated with greater 
cognition as cues to cognitive load. Cues to deception are cues that have been theorized to be, or 
have shown evidence of being, indicative of truth or deception. However, this terminology does 
not posit any underlying mechanism to explain the differences. Cues to cognitive load are 
theorized to be, or show evidence of being, influenced by a higher cognitive demand.  Cues to 
cognitive load within the realm of deception indicate that higher cognitive load is occurring in 
the act of being deceptive. In the next section, I review research that has empirically studied 
deception as a primarily cognitive activity.    
 Evidence of cognitive load in deception. As I previously discussed, the consensus of the 
research tends to indicate a lack of support for the existence of reliable emotional differences 
between liars and truth tellers (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al, 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 
2011), however there is some evidence that there are cognitive differences (Abe, 2011; Masip et 
al., 2005). In reviewing the more successful methods of deception detection, Vrij et al., (2011) 
found that most used cognitively based methods. For example, Hartwig and colleagues 
demonstrated that liars and truth tellers approach deception in strategically different ways. Truth 
tellers have no overt strategies other than to rely on telling the truth, while deceivers spend time 
planning their statements (Hartwig et al., 2007; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 
2006; Hartwig et al., 2005; Strömwall et al., 2006).  
 This idea, that lying is more cognitively difficult or different from telling the truth, is 
supported by empirical studies on the cognitive effort of deception. Caso, Gnisci, Vrij, and Mann 
(2005) found that participants instructed to tell a lie and a truth under high and low stakes 
scenarios reported experiencing greater attempted control of their behavior when lying than 
when telling the truth. Vrij, Semin, and Bull (1996) found that deception was associated with 
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more perceived cognitive effort and more perceived attempts to control their behavior. Leal and 
Vrij (2010) found that liars exhibited more cognitive load compared to those who told the truth 
about a mock crime. Specifically, eye blink rates were measured and liars had a lower rate of eye 
blinks when answering key questions compared to control questions, while truth tellers exhibited 
no differences in eye blink rate. This indicates that it is the act of lying itself that is cognitively 
demanding, not the knowledge that one is guilty and being evaluated. Similarly, Leal et al. 
(2008) studied two groups of participants, those who completed either moderate or difficult 
puzzles and those who told the truth or told a lie. Eye blink rates were lower when participants 
completed difficult puzzles (compared to moderate puzzles) and when participants were lying 
(compared to telling the truth). It is important to point out that no external cognitive load was 
placed on participants in these studies, lending support to the idea that lying possesses its own 
degree of intrinsic cognitive difficulty. In the next section, I review the literature that has 
attempted to exploit the cognitive nature of deception by using cognitive load as a lie detection 
aid.  
Using Cognitive Load to Detect Deception 
There is evidence to suggest that adding cognitive load while completing a task can 
impede performance on other tasks that already induce cognitive load (Paas et al., 2003). Khan, 
Sharma, and Dixit (2008) conducted a test where participants had to solve general knowledge 
questions under either no cognitive load (only had to solve the problems) or high cognitive load 
(both solved the problems and listened to a story for comprehension). Participants also had to 
perform a secondary task either of clicking a certain area of the screen that was either triggered 
by a signal (no added cognitive load) or of clicking the screen after waiting for a set amount of 
time to pass (added cognitive load). Performance on the secondary clicking task was worse under 
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added cognitive load than no added cognitive load. Based on this premise then, adding cognitive 
load to liars and truth tellers should more greatly impede the performance of liars, as they are 
already experiencing cognitive load (Leal et al., 2010; Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij et al., 2011).  
Studies in the deception literature have attempted to increase deception detection 
accuracy by introducing external cognitive load to people in an interview situation. Cheng and 
Broadhurst (2005) had bilingual participants randomly assigned to tell a lie or the truth in either 
their first (Cantonese) or second (English) language. The researchers measured the degree to 
which participants exhibited behavioral cues to deception, which to a large degree contained cues 
to cognitive load (e.g. body movements and speech errors). Participants reported experiencing 
the most cognitive load when they were instructed to lie in their second language. Observers who 
made judgments of these targets had higher lie detection accuracy for those deceiving in the 
second language, but reduced accuracy for those telling the truth in the second language (all 
compared to assessing those speaking in their first language). In other words, in this study it 
seemed that cognitive load hampered not only liars, but also truth tellers. 
Vrij et al. (2008) manipulated the guilt (participants lied about their involvement in a 
mock crime) or innocence (participants told the truth about an activity they completed) of mock 
suspects who were then interviewed under normal conditions or conditions of cognitive load, 
where participants were asked to tell their stories backwards. Those who told lies in reverse order 
exhibited more cues to cognitive load. Specifically, liars had fewer auditory details, fewer 
contextual embeddings, more cognitive operations, a slower speech rate, fewer eye blinks, and 
more leg and foot movements. Observers viewed videotapes of these interviews and made lie 
detection judgments. Accuracy for those interviewed under cognitive load was greater than 
chance and higher than the accuracy of those interviewed under the control condition. Moreover, 
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they found an interaction effect between lie judgments and interview style where liars 
interviewed under cognitive load demonstrated more cues to load than liars who were not placed 
under cognitive load. Truthful participants did not exhibit more cues to cognitive load when 
interviewed under cognitive load compared to being interviewed under no load. In a similar 
study, Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Fisher (2010) induced cognitive load by instructing some 
participants to focus on maintaining eye contact with the interviewer. It was found that when 
participants had to maintain eye contact, deceptive participants exhibited more cues to load than 
did truth tellers. The follow up lie-detection study found increased lie-detection accuracy for 
those interviewed while maintaining eye contact than those who had no instructions. These 
findings indicate that imposing external forms of cognitive load impede liars to a greater degree 
than truth tellers. 
There is some evidence supporting the method of imposing cognitive load during an 
interview to aid lie detectors (e.g. Vrij et al., 2008; 2010). It may be that accuracy could be 
further enhanced by having lie detectors specifically focus on cues to cognitive load or on 
indirect inferences of cognitive load. As previously discussed, people in general have incorrect 
ideas about what cues to focus on when detecting deception (Global Deception Research Team, 
2006; Vrij et al., 2006). Likewise, many training interventions fail or offer only limited 
improvement, likely because they focus attention on the wrong cues to deception (Frank & 
Feeley, 2003; Kassin & Fong, 1999). However, if deception is a cognitive process, as the 
literature indicates it is (Abe, 2011; Gombos, 2006; Vrij et al., 2011), then it may be that 
focusing on cues to cognitive load may be a more effective means of lie detection. Vrij, Edward, 
and Bull (2001) found that participants asked to focus on whether or not suspects were thinking 
hard while making truthful or deceptive statements were more accurate at detecting deception 
THIRD DOCTORAL EXAMINATION                                                                                    20 
 
than those participants asked to directly focus on the truthfulness or deceit of the statements. 
Another study also demonstrated a positive effect of the indirect measures of deception, where 
participants who focused on changes in speech and behavior patterns were more accurate at 
deception detection than those directly assessing deception (Hart, Fillmore, & Griffith, 2009). 
This may be related to judging cues to cognitive load. As previously discussed, speech rate 
patterns and nonverbal body movements have been posed as potential cognitive load cues to 
deception (Vrij et al., 2008). Other research though has found no difference for indirect measures 
for cognitive load (Klaver, Lee, Spidel, & Hart, 2009). A meta-analysis conducted by Bond, 
Levine, and Hartwig (2014) found that, while overall many indirect measures of deception were 
poor compared to the direct assessment of deception, the indirect measure of ‘thinking hard’ did 
outperform the direct measure.  
Overall these studies indicate that there is some benefit to imposing extra cognitive load 
on liars and truth tellers in order to make them more easily distinguishable from each other (Vrij 
et al., 2008; 2010). This is indirectly supported by other evidence. Because the research indicates 
that deception is a cognitive process more so than telling the truth (Abe, 2011; Gombos, 2006; 
Vrij, 2011), by exploiting the cognitive processes required for deception, more accurate methods 
of lie detection can be developed.  
Conclusions and Current Questions 
As discussed, WM appears to be related to the cognitive tasks of deception. Further, there 
is stable individual variability in WM, known as WMC, where those with higher WMC are better 
able to perform cognitive tasks and cope with cognitive load (Engle et al., 1999). Finally, 
cognitive load has been shown to impair liars in terms of their ability to exhibit cues associated 
with truth telling and being judged as truth tellers (Vrij et al., 2008; 2010). As WMC does 
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moderate many cognitive processes (Barrett et al., 2004; Engle et al., 1999), the question remains 
as to whether WMC moderates the ability of people to deceive, specifically when they are 
interviewed using the cognitive load method of deception detection.  
Answering these questions would help in better understanding the role of WM in the 
process of deception. There is strong evidence indicating that WM and executive functions are 
related to deception (Abe, 2011; Gombos, 2006); examining this relationship using WMC allows 
for further support to this idea by showing that WMC moderates deception ability, both free of, 
and while under, cognitive load. Answering these questions would also help develop methods of 
deception detection. Some research has shown that deception may be associated with eye blink 
and hand and finger movements, which tend to be less frequent under cognitive load (Leal et al., 
2008; Vrij et al., 1996), and which translate into better deception detection accuracy (Vrij et al., 
2008; 2010). By better understanding the relationship between WMC and deception, a more 
reliable method for using cues to cognitive load as a measure of deceit may be developed.  
Current Studies 
The current studies attempted to address these research questions by examining WMC in 
relationship to cues of cognitive load that result as a function of deception; the impact of these 
factors on judgments of deception and their accuracy were also examined. In Study 1, 
participants were randomly assigned to lie or tell the truth by completing a task in a mock crime 
scenario. Participants were then interviewed with one of three types of interview styles designed 
to induce a different amount of cognitive load: normal order recall, reverse order recall, or dual-
task recall. Participants’ completed a measure of WMC. The dependent variables were the 
verbal, vocal, and visual cues to cognitive load (Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij et al., 2010).   
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Study 1 also tested the idea that working memory is an important component for lie 
telling. As Unsworth and Engle (2008) demonstrated, higher amounts of cognitive load are better 
handled by those with higher WMC, while those with lower WMC have increasing difficulty as 
the cognitive load increases. As was also previously discussed, deception appears to involve 
many different cognitive load tasks, such as suppressing truthful information and constructing 
plausible deceptive details (Spence et al., 2004). By constructing different conditions which 
manipulate the number of deceptive tasks involved, WMC should play a greater role when more 
deceptive tasks are used. Some deceptive participants told the truth about what they did at an 
earlier point in the day when they were not participating in the study, while ignoring the task 
wherein they stole a wallet. These participants were in essence telling the truth about something 
they did earlier in an attempt to mask the fact of their guilt in the mock crime (a temporal lie). 
Other deceptive participants told about what they did during their time while participating in the 
study, but were asked to leave out or alter any incriminating information. These participants lied 
about the event in which they took the wallet (an event lie).  
The temporal lie should be less cognitive demanding than the event lie as the temporal lie 
involves only the suppression of information. Telling the truth about a different point of time 
should remove some of the cognitive difficulty of lying by eliminating the task of creating 
alternative details. This form of deception should allow the participants to rely primarily on 
memory for details and to be less concerned with self-contradictions as the details of their 
statements will have a basis in reality rather than in imagination. On the other hand, those told to 
tell an event lie do not have this mental aid as they have to tell a lie that closely follows what 
they actually did, while changing or not mentioning the incriminating aspects. This distinction in 
the manipulation of the lies controls for the number of deception tasks involved, such that event 
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lies will involve more elements than those of temporal lies. This allows for the lies to differ in 
terms of cognitive difficulty and thus indicates if this increased difficulty is affected by WMC. 
Study 2 examined how these factors of Study 1, as well as the actual cues to cognitive 
load exhibited by Study 1 suspects, affected the judgments made by observers. Additionally, 
Study 2 examined whether there is any benefit to using judgments of perceptions of suspects’ 
cognitive load as an indirect measure of deception. Participants viewed the videotapes of the 
interviews from Study 1 and made judgments about the amount of deception the suspects were 
exhibiting or the amount of cognitive load the suspect is experiencing. It may be that judging 
how much mental strain a person is exhibiting is an easier task than judging deception. Thus, if 
using judgments of cognitive load is more accurate than judgments of deception, this would add 
further support to the idea that deception is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth. 
Additionally, those factors of deception and cognitive load in Study 1 that predict an increase in 
cues to cognitive load should also be associated with higher judgments of deception in Study 2. 
Moreover, cues to cognitive load should also directly predict decisions made by observers, where 
more cues to cognitive load should be associated with more judgments of deception.  
Study 1 
 The goals of Study 1 were to examine the moderating impact of WMC on the cognitive 
load experienced during a mock crime interview. Specifically, the relationship is examined both 
for the load experienced due to deception and the load experienced due to the interviewing 
method. This study addressed the questions of whether WMC moderates cues to deception. It 
also examined the effect of reducing or increasing cognitive load and the corresponding 
exhibition of cues to cognitive load. Participants were randomly assigned to different veracity 
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conditions and different interview style conditions. The WMC of participants and the cues to 
cognitive load exhibited during the interview were then measured.  
Method 
Participants and design 
 The study is a 3 (Veracity: telling the truth vs. temporal deception vs. event deception) x 
3 (Interview Style: normal order vs. reverse order vs. dual-task) between-subjects design. 
Participants’ WMC was measured as the third independent variable. The required sample size 
was determined with an a priori power analysis using GPower version three (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The smallest significant effect size from Vrij et al. (2008)’s study of 
cognitive load and veracity on indicators of load, r
2
 = .09, was used to determine the sample size 
needed. Using this effect size, 29 predictor coefficients, a significance cutoff of .01, and a 
desired power of .95, the power analysis yielded a minimum sample size of 475.  
Participants were recruited from the New York City (NYC) community via 
advertisements placed on craigslist.com. A total of 509 participants were recruited to participate 
in the study, however 32 failed to achieve the criteria score on the measure of WMC (see below) 
and thus were not included in any further analyses. This yielded a final sample of n = 477. The 
average age was 32.10 (SD = 12.19), with an age range of 18 to 87. In the final sample, 45.7% 
identified as male and 54.3% as female; 37.5% identified as White, 30.6% identified as Black, 
12.8% identified as Hispanic, 12.2% identified as Asian, 4.0% identified as multi-racial, and 
2.9% identified as some other race.  
Materials 
Measure of WMC 
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The measurement of WMC uses an automated version of the operation span task 
(Aospan; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock & Engle, 2005). This is a self-administered computer 
version of the original operation span (Oospan) task. It has been used in previous studies to 
measure WMC, and it has high validity and reliability (see Conway et al., 2005; Engle, 2010). In 
comparing the Aospan with the Oospan and other measures of WMC, Unsworth et al. (2005) 
demonstrated the Aospan to be a useful and valid measure of WMC.  
For the Aospan task, participants read a basic math problem (e.g. (6/3) + 2 = ?). After 
they indicate that they have solved the problem, they are given an answer and directed to 
determine if it is correct or not. After answering this question, participants are presented with a 
letter to remember. An unspecified number of these operations (ranging from 3 to 7) are 
presented in a string to participants so that at the end of the string participants are required to 
recall the letters correctly and in the order presented. Rehearsal of the letters at the end of each 
operation is prevented by initially measuring individual participants’ averages in solving the 
math problems in a trial session. A standard deviation of 2.5 seconds is added to this average; 
participants are only allotted this much time to solve the problems in the test phase (Unsworth et 
al., 2005). Only scores from participants maintaining 85% accuracy on the math problems are 
considered valid; scores lower than this indicate that the final score might be the result of solely 
focusing attention on the recall task. The sum of the correctly recalled trials serves as the WMC 
measure (see Unsworth et al., 2005 for a more thorough description of the Aospan).  
Post-interview measures Participants completed a post-interview questionnaire after the 
conclusion of the interview. As a manipulation check, they were asked to rate the difficulty of 
the interview (1—not at all difficult to 10—very difficult). In addition, several manipulation 
checks were administered and measured. To assess the veracity manipulation, participants were 
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asked to recall what their instructions had been before the interview. Participants then indicated 
whether they had been told to tell the truth, tell a temporal lie, or tell an event lie. Participants 
were also asked to rate how deceptive their statements were (1—completely deceptive to 10—
not at all deceptive). As a further manipulation check, transcripts were rated as to how much of 
the suspects’ activity was stated as having occurred on the study campus (1—all activity 
occurred on the campus to 5—none of the activity occurred on the campus). I expected those 
who told the truth and who told an event lie to have lower scores as they should have primarily 
described activities on the campus.  
To assess the interview manipulation, participants in the dual task interview condition 
were also asked to give a count of how many tones they heard during the interview to verify that 
they were attempting to keep a count during the interview. Additionally, for those in the reverse 
order interview condition, all interview transcripts were coded for the number of ‘reverse’ words 
they contained (e.g. before, prior, previous, etc.). Interrater reliability statistics for the ratings of 
the amount of activity that occurred on campus, the counts assessed from the videotaped 
interview, and the number of reverse order words can be found in Table 1.  
Dependent variables 
Cues to cognitive load. As part of the study, participants were interviewed about their 
involvement in a mock crime (see below). The interviews with the participants were videotaped, 
transcribed, and coded based on Vrij et al. (2008). Videos of the interviews were shot to include 
a full frontal view of the participants so that participants were visible from feet to head. From the 
videos and transcripts several measures were made. Interrater reliabilities were measured for 
each and are presented in Table 1. For each measure, two raters were trained and initially coded 
50 statements or videos; if they achieved sufficient interrater reliability (r ≥ .85) with this 
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amount, they then proceeded to code the remainder of data for that measure separately. If 
sufficient interrater reliability was not achieved, then discrepancies were addressed in a 
discussion with the two raters and the author and were resolved. The two raters then coded 
another 50 videos or transcripts and interrater reliability was then reassessed. Once sufficient 
interrater reliability was achieved, the two raters coded the remainder of the data for that 
measure.  
From the videos, nonverbal visual cues were measured, specifically the number of 
illustrators exhibited (hand gestures accompanying speech), the number of hand, arm and finger 
movements made (hand/arm movements), and the number of foot and leg movements made 
(leg/foot movements). These measures were taken only from the portion of the interview starting 
directly after the interviewer asked the only interview question to the point when participants 
completed their response. Response delay (the amount of time between when the interviewer 
asked the interview question and the time when the participant started their response) was 
measured using the software program Audacity. Wavelength form of the audio was examined for 
the exact point when the interviewer stopped speaking and this was subtracted from the point 
when the participant began speaking. In addition, the total length of the interview (as measured 
from the point where the interviewer stopped speaking subtracted from the point when the 
suspect stopped speaking) as well as the total length of the response (as measured by the time the 
suspect started talking subtracted from when the suspect stopped talking) were measured using 
Audacity. The length of pauses could not be reliably coded from the videotapes or Audacity and 
thus this measure was not used further. Speech rate was measured by the number of total words 
spoken by the participant divided by the total length of the participants’ response. Blinks were 
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measured by counting the number of times a suspect blinked during the total length of the 
interview.  
A number of cues were measured based on the verbatim transcripts. Visual and auditory 
details were coded (things that suspects stated they saw or heard). Unlike in Vrij’s (2008) study, 
we could not directly assess what all participants would have actually seen or heard, due to the 
fact that some participants told of events that occurred outside of the study. Thus cues were 
counted as seen or heard if participants stated they actually saw or interacted with something. For 
example, a participant saying they looked for a book would not count as a detail as there is no 
direct statement that they ever found or saw said book. Such a statement only references back to 
the specific task instructions, not the actual experience. Thus it is not a detail of something they 
witnessed or heard. However, a person stating that they looked in a pile of books would count as 
the person specifically mentioned something seen. A participant saying that they touched a 
briefcase would count as a detail because they indicated that they interacted with the briefcase 
and therefore would necessarily have seen it. Due to the very low number of auditory details, 
these were combined with visual details into one variable called details. Transcripts were also 
coded for contextual embeddings (details relating to where a person or object is in space and/or 
time). As an example, if a person mentioned they arrived at noon or took 5 minutes to complete a 
task, these would count as a contextual embedding because they refer to where the person is in 
time. Cognitive operations were also measured (i.e., references to a person’s state of mind). For 
example, for a person who stated they thought an item was in a room or that someone else saw 
the person enter a building, both of these types of statements would be coded as cognitive 
operations. The first statement reveals something about the participants’ state of mind that could 
not be directly observed; the second statement reveals something about the participant’s 
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assumption about knowledge that someone else has. Speech fillers (e.g. um, uh, etc.) and errors 
(stating a word twice or more, stating a phrase twice or more, not finishing a thought or sentence, 
etc.) were also measured from the transcripts.  
Procedure 
Participants provided informed consent and then completed a task designed to manipulate 
guilt or innocence. Those randomly assigned to tell a lie were directed to steal a wallet from a 
briefcase in another room and to conceal the wallet on their person or in their bags. These 
participants verified to the experimenter that they took the wallet. Those assigned to tell the truth 
were directed to look for a book about Freud in the same room where the briefcase and wallet 
were located (they were not told anything specifically about the wallet). The book was not 
present. This was done so that these participants would return from the room empty-handed
1
.  
After completing the task, participants were then informed that a crime had been 
committed and that they would be interviewed about their possible involvement. Those assigned 
to tell the truth were further told to simply tell the truth about their activities during the task. 
Those assigned to tell a temporal lie were told to tell the truth about something they did earlier in 
the day, but to make it seem as though they had been doing that during the time they completed 
the task. Those assigned to tell an event lie were told to tell as much of the truth about what they 
had done during the task, but to either omit or change the details regarding the theft of the wallet. 
All participants were asked to explain the instructions back to the experimenter to verify that 
they understood.  
                                                 
1
 A significant minority of these participants brought back a textbook on abnormal psychology because they found a 
reference to Freud in the index. All of these participants admitted to having had taken a book in the interview, so it 
is not believed that this affected their propensity to give a truthful statement during the interview. 
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All participants were told they would be interviewed by an interviewer who did not know 
whether they are guilty or innocent of the wallet theft (all interviewers were in fact blind to 
veracity), and that their goal was to convince the interviewer that they were innocent. All 
participants were given time to prepare themselves for the interview. Once they indicated that 
they were ready for the interview, they were escorted to a separate interview room. They were 
asked to sit in a chair facing a camera.  
The interviewer
2
 then entered the room and stood across from the participants. The 
interviewer began the interview by explaining that the participant was suspected of stealing a 
wallet that had recently been reported missing in the area. Participants were asked only one 
question, which was to give an account of where they had been and what they had done in the 
past 30 minutes and to be as detailed as possible. An explanation of the interview style was also 
given if the interview condition was reverse order or dual task. Participants interviewed with 
reverse order were asked to give their account in a backwards order, starting at the end of their 
activities and going backwards in time. Participants in the dual task condition were told to give 
their account while also counting a series of tones
3
 that were played during the interview (the 
tones began once the interviewer finished asking the interview question). Participants were then 
asked if they understood the instructions and were provided with any follow up explanation if 
                                                 
2 A total of six different interviewers interviewed participants for this study. Each interviewer was trained by the 
primary interviewer and each followed one of three different scripts, depending on the interview condition. 
Interviewers were trained to be as neutral as possible, not to smile or nod or otherwise give any nonverbal feedback 
to participants, nor to give any verbal feedback or answer the questions of participants, unless it was necessary to 
conduct the interview.  
3
 The tones were constructed by recording three minutes of tones played at random intervals and then playing this 
recording on a loop through a pair of speakers attached to a desktop computer. 
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necessary. Once participants indicated they understood the instructions, they were allotted as 
much time as they desired to answer the question. If participants gave very short and undetailed 
responses, they were then given a prompt to give more information. Interviewers were instructed 
to not give this prompt more than twice. Once the participant finished responding, the 
interviewer stated that the interview was concluded and, if the interview was dual task, the 
interviewer asked the participant to report how many tones they counted during the interview.  
After the interview, the experimenter escorted participants back to the main study room 
where participants completed the post-interview measures. Participants then completed the 
Aospan task. Finally, participants were fully debriefed and paid $15 for their participation. 
Hypotheses  
The primary outcome variables are the measures of cognitive load. These variables are 
operationalized as statement details (more indicates less cognitive load), statement contextual 
embeddings (more indicates less cognitive load), statement cognitive operations (more indicates 
more cognitive load), statement errors (more indicates more cognitive load), statement fillers 
(more indicates more cognitive load), speech rate (faster indicates less cognitive load), response 
delay (longer indicates more cognitive load), blinks (more indicates less cognitive load), 
illustrators (more indicates less cognitive load), hand/arm movements (more indicates less 
cognitive load), and leg/foot movements (more indicates less cognitive load).  
Hypothesis 1A: In line with the literature on the cognitive load method of lie detection (e.g. Vrij 
et al., 2008) and the literature indicating more cognitive difficulty being associated with more 
cognitive load (e.g. Paas et al., 2003; Unsworth & Engle, 2008), there will be a main effect for 
veracity on the cognitive load behaviors. Participants assigned to event deception will exhibit 
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more cues to cognitive load than will those assigned to temporal deception, who will exhibit 
more cues than those assigned to tell the truth.  
Hypothesis 1B: In line with the literature regarding the cognitive load method of lie detection 
(e.g. Vrij et al., 2008) and the literature regarding more cognitive  difficulty being associated 
with more cognitive load (e.g. Paas et al., 2003; Unsworth & Engle, 2008) there will be a main 
effect for interview style on the cognitive load behaviors. Participants assigned to the dual task 
condition will exhibit more cues to cognitive load than will those assigned to the reverse order 
condition, who will exhibit more cues than those assigned to normal order. 
Hypothesis 1C: In line with the literature regarding the cognitive load method of lie detection 
(e.g. Vrij et al., 2008) and again based on the literature demonstrating that more cognitive 
difficulty is associated with more cognitive load (e.g. Paas et al., 2003; Unsworth & Engle, 2008) 
there will be an interaction effect for veracity and interview style on the cues to cognitive load. 
Those participants assigned to event deception will exhibit more cues to cognitive load when 
interviewed under cognitive load than those assigned to temporal deception. Both of these groups 
will exhibit more cues to load than those assigned to tell the truth while being interviewed under 
cognitive load. 
Hypothesis 1D: In line with the literature regarding the moderating effects of WMC on 
cognitive difficulty (e.g. Colfesh & Conway, 2007; Unsworth & Engle, 2008) there will be an 
interaction between veracity and WMC on the cues to cognitive load. The relationship between 
cues to cognitive load and WMC will be stronger for those telling an event lie compared to a 
temporal lie, which will in turn be stronger than for those telling the truth.  
Hypothesis 1E: In line with the literature regarding the moderating effects of WMC on cognitive 
difficulty (e.g. Colfesh & Conway, 2007; Unsworth & Engle, 2008) there will be an interaction 
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effect between interview style and WMC on the cues to cognitive load. The relationship between 
cues to cognitive load and WMC will be stronger for those interviewed with dual task compared 
to reverse order, which will in turn be stronger than for those interviewed with normal order. 
Hypothesis 1F: In line with the literature regarding the moderating effects of WMC on cognitive 
difficulty (e.g. Colfesh & Conway, 2007; Unsworth & Engle, 2008), there will be a three way 
interaction effect between veracity, interview, and WMC on the cues to cognitive load. The 
relationship between WMC and cues to cognitive load will be stronger under conditions when 
more cognitive load is present (see Figures 1 through 3). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 9 cells. The distribution of the sample of 
all the conditions and WMC scores are presented in Table 2. Eleven measures of cues to 
cognitive load were assessed. The correlation matrix of the observed cues to cognitive load is 
presented in Table 3. The correlations of these measures with WMC are presented in Table 4. 
The distributions of the means for these measures across the conditions are presented in Tables 5 
through 15. The significance tests for each analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for all of the 
cognitive load measures as well as their effect sizes are presented in Tables 16 through 21. 
Manipulation checks 
 Three manipulation checks were performed for veracity. First, after the interview, 
participants were asked to recall what their veracity instructions were. Comparing those who did 
not recall their instructions correctly to those who did recall their instructions correctly, it 
appears the majority of participants (97%) correctly recalled their instructions, χ
2 
(8) = 439.61, p 
≤ .001. Second, participants were asked to rate how deceptive their statements were, F (2, 474) = 
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198.08, p ≤ .001. Post-hoc test showed that those telling the truth (M = 9.57, SD = 1.03) rated 
their statements as more truthful than those telling a temporal lie (M = 6.43, SD = 2.56), Mdiff = 
3.13, p ≥ .001, or an event lie (M = 4.85, SD = 2.52), Mdiff = 4.72, p ≥ .001, and those telling a 
temporal lie rated their statements as more truthful than those telling an event lie, Mdiff = 1.59, p 
≥ .001. Third, interview transcripts were coded for the degree that the events discussed occurred 
on campus, F (2, 474) = 537.82, p ≤ .001. Post-hoc testing showed that as expected, telling the 
truth (M = 1.53, SD = .79) and event deception (M = 1.49, SD = .92) were not different from 
each other, Mdiff = .04, p ≥ .05, but that temporal deception (M = 4.34, SD = .95) was rated to 
have more events occurring off campus than both telling the truth, Mdiff = 2.81, p ≤ .001, and 
those telling an event lie, Mdiff = 2.84, p ≤ .001. 
 Three manipulation checks were performed for interview style. To assess whether or not 
individuals were keeping count of the tones during the interview, participants interviewed with 
dual task were asked to provide a final tally at the end of the interview. Accuracy was calculated 
by dividing the total number of tones participants reported by the total number of tones actually 
played (or the reverse if the total number of tones actually played was smaller than the number 
reported). The overall accuracy was 72% (SD = 19.79). There were no differences in count 
accuracy due to the veracity manipulation, F (2, 154) = .13, p = .88. This relatively high 
accuracy indicates that participants were attempting to keep track of and count the tones during 
their interview, and thus following the instructions. The second manipulation check was for 
those interviewed in reverse order, where the number of reverse order words were assessed from 
the interview transcripts, F (2, 474) = 197.39, p ≤ .001. Post-hoc testing demonstrated that as 
expected there was no difference in the number of reverse order words between normal order (M 
= .19, SD = .64) and dual task (M = .14, SD = .47), Mdiff = .05, p ≥ .05, but that there were more 
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reverse order words in the reverse order condition (M = 3.66, SD = 3.03) compared to both the 
normal order, Mdiff = 3.47, p ≤ .001, and dual task conditions, Mdiff = 3.52, p ≤ .001. The third 
manipulation check was to assess the perceived difficulty of each interview condition, F (2, 474) 
= 70.26, p ≤ .001. Post-hoc testing revealed that dual task (M = 7.68, SD = 2.59) was perceived 
as more difficult compared to both reverse order, Mdiff = 2.14, p ≤ .001, and normal order, Mdiff = 
3.56, p ≤ .001, and as well that reverse order (M = 5.53, SD = 2.90) was perceived as more 
difficult, Mdiff = 1.42, p ≤ .001, than normal order (M = 4.11, SD = 2.56). 
Hypothesis testing 
All six hypotheses were tested using ANCOVA models. WMC scores were entered as a 
covariate and the variables for interview style and veracity were entered as categorical predictor 
variables. This analysis differs from Vrij et al. (2008) because of the continuous measure of the 
WMC scores. In Vrij et al. (2008) only the interview method and the veracity variables (both 
categorical) were used, and thus an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was appropriate. It is 
necessary to test the hypotheses for this study using an ANCOVA in order to account for the 
WMC scores. Prior to conducting any hypothesis testing, WMC scores were examined to 
determine if there was any confounding with the two predictor variables of veracity and 
interview style; an ANOVA indicated that there was no such confounding (Miller & Chapman, 
2001). In addition, the cues to cognitive load were factor analyzed to reduce the number of 
dependent variables and were examined in relation to the independent variables in ANCOVA 
models.  
Hypothesis 1A: There was no main effect for veracity on any of the cues to cognitive load. 
There was one effect bordering on significance for the number of blinks exhibited, F (2, 448) = 
2.82, p = .06, η
2 
= .01, where those participants telling the truth exhibited fewer blinks compared 
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to those telling a temporal lie, Mdiff = 3.22, p = .02, and those telling an event lie, Mdiff = 3.38, p = 
.01. 
Hypothesis 1B: For the effect of the interview, there were main effects for verbal and vocal 
cues. For verbal cues, there was a main effect for details, F (2, 453) = 7.82, p ≤ .001, η
2 
= .03, 
where those interviewed with reverse order provided more details in their statements than those 
interviewed with normal order, Mdiff = 4.11, p ≤ .001, or dual task, Mdiff = 3.92, p ≤ .001. There 
was also an effect on contextual embeddings, F (2, 446) = 7.89, p ≤ .001, η
2 
= .03, where those 
interviewed with reverse order provided more contextual embeddings than those interviewed 
with normal order, Mdiff = 2.50, p ≤ .001, or dual task, Mdiff = 2.32, p ≤ .001. For vocal cues, there 
was a main effect for speech errors, F (2, 447) = 4.61, p = .01, η
2 
= .02, where those interviewed 
with reverse order exhibited more speech errors than those interviewed with normal order, Mdiff = 
1.07, p ≤ .001, or dual task, Mdiff = .76, p = .01. There was also an effect for speech fillers, F (2, 
448) = 3.95, p = .02, η
2 
= .02, where those interviewed with reverse order exhibited more speech 
fillers than those interviewed with normal order, Mdiff = 1.33, p = .01. There was also an effect 
for response delay, F (2, 448) = 12.73, p ≤ .001, η
2 
= .05, where those interviewed with dual task 
had a longer response delay than those interviewed with normal order, Mdiff = .95, p ≤ .001, or 
reverse order, Mdiff = .85, p ≤ .001.    
Hypothesis 1C: An interaction effect for veracity and interview was found for one variable: 
hand/arm movements, F (4, 445) = 2.63, p = .03, η
2 
= .02. Essentially, for participants who told 
either type of lie, they exhibited more hand/arm movements in the reverse order interview 
condition than in the other two conditions. However, this effect was reversed for those telling the 
truth, where they exhibited fewer hand/arm movements in the reverse order condition than in the 
other interview conditions (see Figure 4).  
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Hypothesis 1D: Regarding the interaction effect of WMC with interview style, there were no 
significant interactions for any of the variables. 
Hypothesis 1E: Regarding the interaction effect of WMC with veracity, there was one 
significant effect for the variable contextual embeddings, F (2, 446) = 4.78, p = .01, η
2 
= .02. 
Essentially the relationship of WMC and veracity type was weak and non-significant for both 
types of lies, but was much stronger and significant for telling the truth (see Figure 5). For those 
participant's telling the truth, those with higher WMC exhibited more contextual embeddings 
than those with lower WMC.  
Hypothesis 1F: Regarding the three way interaction effect for veracity, interview style, and 
WMC there were significant effects with regards to some of the visual cues of cognitive load. 
There was a three-way interaction for the variable of blinks, F (4, 448) = 3.34, p = .01, η
2 
= .03. 
Looking at the pattern of WMC regression relationships with blinks for each veracity type by 
interview condition, the pattern of regression coefficients is different depending on the interview 
type. Considering the interview methods of normal order (see Figure 6) and dual task (see Figure 
7), those participants telling a lie had a weaker positive relationship between the number of 
blinks they exhibited and their WMC score. However, there was a stronger, negative relationship 
for those who were telling the truth. Therefore, for those telling a lie interviewed with either 
normal order or dual task, those with higher WMC exhibited more blinks, and those telling the 
truth who had stronger WMC exhibited fewer blinks. However, when considering the interview 
condition of reverse order (see Figure 8), the opposite pattern emerges. There was a negative 
relationship between the number of blinks exhibited and WMC, such that the higher the WMC 
the fewer cues to cognitive load exhibited. However, for those telling the truth being interviewed 
with reverse order, the higher the WMC score, the more blinks are exhibited.  
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 A significant three-way interaction was also found for the variable of hand/arm 
movements, F (4, 445) = 2.79, p = .03, η
2 
= .02. Again, considering the WMC regression slopes 
for each type of veracity individually by interview style, a different pattern emerges for each 
interview type. Considering only those participants who were interviewed under normal order, 
there was a positive relationship between the number of hand/arm movements and WMC for 
those telling a lie, but a negative relationship for those telling the truth (see Figure 9). For those 
telling a lie, those who had higher WMC exhibited more hand/arm movements but for those 
telling the truth those who had a lower WMC exhibited more hand/arm movements. Next, 
considering those interviewed with reverse order (see Figure 10), those who told the truth or told 
a temporal lie exhibited a positive relationship between WMC and hand/arm movements, while 
those who told an event lie exhibited a negative relationship. For those who told the truth or told 
a temporal lie, those with higher WMC exhibited more hand/arm movements. However for those 
telling an event lie, those with a lower WMC exhibited more hand/arm movements. Finally, 
considering only those interviewed with dual task (see Figure 11), all veracity types had a 
positive association with WMC and hand/arm movements, but the relationship was much weaker 
for those telling a temporal lie.  
Exploratory Factor Analysis: An exploratory factor analysis, using orthogonal rotation, found 
two factors with an Eigen value greater than 1. The loadings of these factors (see Table 22) 
indicated that the cues of details, contextual embeddings, cognitive operations, errors, fillers, 
blinks, illustrators, and foot/leg movements loaded onto factor 1, and was labeled general 
cognitive load. Lower numbers on this factor indicate more general cognitive load. The cues of 
speech rate and response delay loaded onto factor 2, and thus is labeled taking time to think. 
Lower numbers on this factor indicate taking less time to think. 
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 These factors were examined as the dependent variables in the ANCOVA model (see 
Table 23). The results indicated that for general cognitive load, there was a significant effect for 
veracity, F (2, 459) = 3.66, p = .03, η
2
 = .01. Those who were telling the truth (M = .26, SD = 
1.17) exhibited less general cognitive load than those who were telling a lie (temporal lie: M = -
.06, SD = .97; event lie: M = -.21, SD = .75). There was also a main effect of interview style on 
general cognitive load, F (2, 459) = 5.69, p = .004, η
2
 = .02. Those interviewed with reverse 
order (M = .36, SD = 1.34) demonstrated less general cognitive load than those interviewed with 
normal order (M = -.18, SD = .72) or dual task (M = -.19, SD = .70). For the factor of taking time 
to think, there was a main effect due to interview style, F (2, 459) = 8.55, p ≤ .001 , η
2
 = .03. 
Those in the dual task (M = .40, SD = .95) condition took more time to think than those in the 
normal order (M = -.33, SD = .98) or reverse order (M = -.07, SD = .93) conditions.  
Discussion 
 
 The purpose of Study 1 was to determine the effects of different types of cognitively 
demanding interview styles and veracity statements on cues to cognitive load, and how these 
effects are moderated by WMC. Several hypotheses predicted what these effects would be. 
However, these hypotheses were generally not supported by the pattern of effects that were 
observed. There was no effect for veracity, except for a borderline significant effect for blinks, in 
which those telling the truth exhibited more blinks than those telling a lie. Additionally, I did not 
observe the expected effect in which those telling an event lie would exhibit more cues to 
cognitive load than those telling an event lie.  
The effects of interview style were more pronounced. Overall the results suggested that 
the reverse order interview style was the least cognitively demanding (i.e. more statement details, 
more contextual embeddings, and fewer speech fillers) compared to the normal order and dual 
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task interview styles. This was the opposite of what the hypothesis predicted. I found that a more 
cognitively demanding interview produced fewer cues to cognitive load, even though reverse 
order was perceived by participants as less demanding than dual task. Additionally, there was no 
effect of the dual task interview style on producing cues to cognitive load compared to those 
interviewed with normal order, even though dual task was perceived to be more highly 
demanding. In other words, though there were more cues to cognitive load produced by the dual 
task interview style compared to the reverse order style (as predicted), this effect is negated by 
the fact that the dual task interview style and normal order interview style were statistically the 
same. Surprisingly, it seems that reverse order had the effect of giving cognitive aid to 
participants.  
As for the interaction between interview style and veracity, the cognitive load produced 
by lying did seem to be moderated by the interview style of reverse order. For those participants 
telling the truth, reverse order was associated with more cues to cognitive load (i.e. fewer 
hand/arm movements) compared to normal order and dual task. However, for those telling a lie, 
reverse order was associated with fewer cues to cognitive load compared to normal order and 
dual task. This finding is the opposite of what was predicted. In addition, this effect does not 
shed much light on understanding the main effects of either veracity or interview style as this 
interaction effect was only significant for hand/arm movements; hand/arm movements were not 
affected by either veracity or interview style.  
With regard to the moderating impact of WMC on these effects, there was no moderating 
impact of WMC with regard to interview style and only some impact on the effect of veracity. 
The impact on veracity was the opposite of that predicted, where I observed a positive 
association of WMC with cognitive load (i.e. more contextual embeddings) for participants 
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telling the truth, however there were weaker and non-significant relationships for participants 
telling lies. The hypothesis predicted instead that the relationship should have been stronger for 
those telling lies compared to those telling the truth, as telling lies should have been more 
cognitively demanding and thus would have required more WMC.  
The moderating impact of WMC on the interaction of interview style and veracity is a bit 
more complex. There were effects present for the outcome variables of blinks and hand/arm 
movements, but the patterns observed were slightly different. With regard to blinks, there was no 
relationship between WMC and blinks, except there was a significant and negative relationship 
for those assigned to tell a temporal lie under the condition of reverse order. This is also the 
opposite of what was predicted by the hypothesis. This hypothesis predicted that this relationship 
would be strong and positive. The fact that it is negative indicates that WMC has the reverse 
pattern relationship with cognitive load than expected. In regard to hand/arm movements, the 
effect is different. Those telling the truth and interviewed under reverse order and those telling a 
temporal lie under normal order had a strong positive relationship between their WMC and the 
number of hand/arm movements they exhibited. These findings are in line with the hypothesis. 
With the addition of cognitive load, both from the interview style and from veracity, the 
relationship between WMC and the measure of cognitive load becomes stronger, as predicted. 
However the predicted interaction between veracity and interview style is not fully supported. If 
it were then the relationships between cues to cognitive load and WMC would be even stronger 
under conditions of higher cognitive difficulty (e.g. those telling an event lie under dual task). 
However, there were no significant effects for these conditions of interview style and veracity.  
With regards to the interaction effect of WMC x Veracity x Interview Style, there were 
significant effects observed, but they did not support the hypothesis. The main aspect of these 
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results seemed to be that again reverse order affected the relationship between WMC and the 
observed cue of cognitive load, but not in the manner predicted. Rather the results provide 
further evidence that reverse order sometimes provides cognitive aid to suspects.   
In general, the results of Study 1 do not support the hypotheses of Study 1, showing often 
either null effects or the opposite patterns of those predicted. In general, the results indicate that 
the effect of interview style had the greatest impact on cues to cognitive load. The results were 
driven primarily by the reverse order interview condition, which not only did not behave as 
predicted but in many situations it provided a cognitive boost to participants, rather than a 
hindrance as expected.  
Limitations 
 There are some limitations to Study 1 that may explain some of the results. One 
limitation that should be considered is that the manipulation of veracity may not have been 
strong enough to produce observable differences in cognitive load. Though each of the veracity 
statements are different from each other in what they require of the participant (tell the truth 
about what was just done, tell the truth about an earlier event, tell a partially fabricated story of 
what was just done), it may be that these three types of statements did not differ significantly in 
the degree of cognitive load they induced. It is unclear whether this is the case, as manipulation 
checks revealed that participants perceived themselves to be more deceptive for event lies, 
slightly less deceptive for temporal lies, and hardly deceptive at all for telling the truth. It seems 
then there were some differences between the types of veracity statements, but again it may be 
that these differences were not strong enough to demonstrate differences in the measures of 
cognitive load. Future research studies could remedy this by implementing stronger 
manipulations of cognitively difficult lies and comparing these to very cognitively easy lies.  
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Another limitation could be that the manipulation of interview styles did not sufficiently 
manipulate different levels of cognitive load. The results indicate that indeed the reverse order 
condition produced less cognitive load than those of dual task and normal order. Likewise, the 
conditions of normal order and dual task produced similar levels of cues to cognitive load. These 
conditions were rated as appropriately differing in their perceived levels of difficulty, but it may 
be that they did not have the actual intended effect. It could be that the interview condition of 
dual task was too difficult and participants payed less attention to counting the tones and focused 
instead on telling their statements. Though there was no difference in the accuracy of the 
participants’ counts based on the veracity of their statements. It could be that the interview was 
so difficult that even those telling the truth had to ignore the task of counting the tones. This 
could explain why the condition of dual task resembled that of normal order, in terms of the 
number of cues exhibited. However, the relatively high accuracy in keeping count of the tones 
(72%) indicates that participants were not entirely ignoring the secondary counting task. 
Another limitation of this study may be the measure of WMC that was used. Many 
studies examining WMC look at two or three separate measures of WMC (e.g. Colfesh & 
Conway, 2007; Unsworth et al., 2010). This was not done for the current study because it was 
not feasible for the allotted resources in terms of the increased amount of time and money 
needed. Likewise, many studies examining WMC only look at the bottom and top quartile of 
scores of WMC (e.g. Conway et al., 1999; 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003). I examined the entire 
range of scores because I did not have the resources to recruit twice the number of participants in 
order to prescreen the scores, and also because I did not posit that the moderating effect of WMC 
is limited only to those with extremely high or extremely low WMC (Preacher, Rucker, 
MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005). It may be that using only one measure of WMC and/or 
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examining the entire range of WMC explains why there was not so great an impact of WMC in 
the study. Future research could remedy this by using multiple measures of WMC to ensure that 
it is reliably measured. Future research could also screen an initially larger sample size that will 
allow for a later comparison of the highest and lowest quartiles of WMC scores of participants.   
However, one measure of WMC is considered adequate enough (Conway et al., 2001; 
Kane & Engle, 2003; Unsworth & Engle, 2008) and, in general, examining the entire range of 
scores is considered a better test of the hypothesis, as using extreme groups comparisons can 
greatly inflate the observed effects (Preacher et al., 2005). While using the entire range of WMC 
scores may explain the results, it is still important to recognize that results observed in this study 
might be a closer reflection of the true relationship between WMC and cues to cognitive load.  
The main limitation of Study 1 may be the measures of cognitive load themselves. There 
was very little consistency in the pattern of the individual measures, indicating that they may in 
fact be measuring different things and they may not all be cognitive load. Indeed the correlations 
of the cues of cognitive load with each other were small to moderate in size. It may be that 
cognitive load was not adequately measured in this study and thus a proper test of the hypothesis 
was not conducted. While each of these cues have been hypothesized and found to be measures 
of cognitive load in previous studies (e.g. Leal & Vrij, 2010; Vrij et al., 2008), it may be that 
they are not strong measures. Future research should further study these cues to cognitive load, 
perhaps by using tasks known to be cognitively demanding (rather than deception, which is less 
well researched in this arena) to determine the reliability of these cues.  
Additionally, it is important to note that the operationalization of some of the cues in the 
current study was different from that of Vrij et al. (2008). In the current study, only sensory 
details were coded for in the category of details and actions were coded for in the category of 
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contextual embeddings and cues could not be coded into more than one category. This could 
explain the lower number of details found in the current study compared to that of Vrij et al. 
(2008). This could further explain the discrepancies in the results, especially in regard to the 
effects of the reverse order interview style on the imposition of cognitive load.  
Study 2 
 The goal of Study 2 is to examine what effect the Study 1 variables have on lie judgments 
made by observers. Study 1 attempted to provide an understanding of how WMC and the 
cognitive load of different types of veracity and interview styles affect the people giving the 
statements. But equally important is to understand how this might impact the ability to 
distinguish liars from truth tellers. Prior research has demonstrated that the addition of cognitive 
load improves this ability. Study 2 seeks to expand on this further by examining how the effects 
of Study 1’s different interview style conditions, the different veracity conditions, and the 
exhibited cues to cognitive load affect lie detectors’ decision accuracy. A sample of observers 
watched videos randomly selected from Study 1 and made implicit or explicit judgments of 
deception. The cognitive load exhibited by the suspects, their WMC, as well as the conditions 
they were assigned to in Study 1, were examined to see if they predicted the decisions and 
accuracy of the observers. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were randomly assigned to make implicit or explicit judgments of deception 
from the videotaped interviews of suspects from Study 1. In addition, this study also used the 
manipulated independent variables of Study 1 as predictor variables. This yielded a 2 (Judgment 
type: implicit vs. explicit) x 3 (Suspect’s veracity: telling the truth vs. temporal lie vs. event lie) x 
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3 (Suspect’s interview style: normal order vs. reverse order vs. dual task) design, in which 
judgment type is a within subjects variable and suspect’s veracity and suspect’s interview style 
are between. Suspect’s WMC and cues to cognitive load were examined as continuous predictors 
as well.  Again, the sample size was determined using GPower version three (Faul et al., 2007), 
which was used to conduct an a priori power analysis. Using the smallest significant effect size 
for accuracy, r
2
 = .17, from Vrij et al. (2008), a total of 59 coefficients, a significance level of 
.01, and a desired power of .95, the minimum sample required for the analyses was 325.  
Ultimately, a final sample of n = 352 individuals were recruited from the NYC 
community via ads placed on craigslist.com, from the Baton Rouge undergraduate community 
via ads placed on the Louisiana State University (LSU) human research subjects system, and 
from a national sample via ads placed on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT). The average age 
of the participants was 32.53 (SD = 10.49), with an age range of 18 to 67. In regards to gender, 
50.9% identified as male and 49.1% identified as female; in regards to race, 70.2% identified as 
White, 11.9% identified as Asian, 8.2% identified as Black, 3.7% identified as Hispanic, 2.8% 
identified as multiracial, and 3.1% identified as some other race.  
Materials 
Each participant completed a questionnaire after watching one of the randomly selected 
videos from Study 1. All participants rated the degree of deceptiveness of the suspect (1—
everything seemed genuine to 10—everything seemed suspicious) as well as the degree of 
cognitive load the suspect was experiencing (1—not thinking hard at all to 10—thinking very 
hard). For participants asked to give explicit judgments, they rated the deception of the suspect at 
the beginning of the questionnaire, and the load at the end of the questionnaire; for those asked to 
make implicit judgments, this was reversed. These scales were bisected to determine the final 
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decisions of the participants. On the deception scale, a score of 1 through 5 indicates a final 
judgment of telling the truth and a score of 6 through 10 represents a judgment of lying. On the 
load scale, a score of 1 through 5 represents a final judgment of telling the truth and a score of 6 
through 10 represents a judgment of lying.  
Accuracy was computed using these two rating scales of deception and load which, for 
the purposes of this study, were considered interchangeable (where a rating of 10 on the load 
scale is considered the same as a 10 on the deception scale). For those judging a truthful person, 
the coding of the scales was reversed, where for those judging a deceptive person, the scale 
remained the same. This resulted in an accuracy scale in which 10 is the most accurate and 1 is 
the least accurate. The scale was then bisected to determine accuracy of the final decision of the 
participant, where 6 through 10 represent an accurate judgment and 1 through 5 represent an 
inaccurate judgment.  
Procedure 
 Participants recruited from craigslist.com or the LSU human research subjects program 
participated in a laboratory setting. They gave informed consent and were randomly assigned to 
the implicit or explicit condition and received appropriate instructions. Those in the explicit 
condition were told they would be watching a video of a person being interviewed about a 
missing wallet and they were to determine if the person was guilty or innocent of the theft of the 
wallet. Those in the implicit condition were told that they would be watching a video of a person 
being interviewed about a missing wallet and they were to determine if the person was thinking 
hard or not thinking hard during the interview. Participants viewed the videos on a desktop 
computer wearing headphones. After viewing the video participants completed the post-
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questionnaire appropriate to their condition. Participants were then fully debriefed and paid $5 
for their participation.  
Those participants recruited from AMT completed the study in a similar fashion, except 
they participated online. Only participants screened for high performance on previous work 
completed through AMT were invited to participate. Those invited were sent a link to an online 
survey that contained the informed consent for the study. Those who agreed to participate were 
randomly assigned to the implicit or explicit decision making conditions and were then provided 
with a link to the same instructions received by the LSU and craigslist.com participants. 
Participants were then giving a link to one of the privately hosted videos from Study 1. They 
were given a time limit of 5 minutes to watch the video in order to prevent them from rewatching 
the video. Participants were then given the link to the condition appropriate questionnaire. In 
addition, they were also asked to indicate which interview style had been used in the interview 
they had viewed in order to verify that they had viewed the video. No participants failed this 
manipulation check. Finally, participants were provided with a link to the debriefing page and 
were compensated with $3 for their participation.  
Hypotheses  
 
 The predictor variables will be WMC, interview style, and veracity of the suspects in 
Study 1 as well as the cues to cognitive load they exhibited. The dependent measures for Study 2 
will be the participants rating of veracity, cognitive load, and accuracy in decision making.  
Hypothesis 2A: In line with the literature regarding the implicit cognitive load measure of lie 
detection (e.g. Vrij et al., 2001) there will be a higher accuracy for those making implicit 
judgments of cognitive load compared to those making judgments of deception.  
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Hypothesis 2B: In line with the predictions of Study 1 and the literature regarding the cognitive 
load method of lie detection (e.g. Vrij et al., 2008), there will be a main effect for veracity on 
ratings of cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy. Ratings of cognitive load, ratings of 
deception, and accuracy will be higher for judging those telling the truth compared to those 
telling a lie. 
Hypothesis 2C: In line with the predictions of Study 1 and the literature regarding the cognitive 
load method of lie detection (e.g. Vrij et al., 2008), there will be a main effect for interview style 
on ratings of cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy. Ratings of cognitive load, ratings 
of deception, and accuracy will be higher when judging those interviewed under cognitive load 
conditions compared with the normal order condition.  
Hypothesis 2D: In line with the predictions of Study 1 and the literature regarding the cognitive 
load method of lie detection (e.g. Vrij et al., 2008), there will be an interaction between interview 
style and veracity on ratings of cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy. Ratings of 
cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy will be higher for assessing deceptive 
participants when they are interviewed under cognitive load than when interviewed under no 
cognitive load.  
Hypothesis 2E: In line with the predictions of Study 1, there will be an interaction between 
WMC and veracity on ratings of cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy. Ratings of 
cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy for judging deceptive participants with lower 
WMC will be higher than for those with higher WMC. 
Hypothesis 2F: In keeping with the predictions of Study 1, there will be an interaction between 
WMC and interview style on ratings of cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy. 
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Ratings of cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy for judging participants interviewed 
under cognitive load with lower WMC will be higher than for those with higher WMC.  
Hypothesis 2G: In keeping with the predictions of Study 1, there will be a three-way interaction 
between interview style, veracity, and WMC on ratings of cognitive load, ratings of deception, 
and accuracy. Ratings of cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy will be higher when 
assessing deceptive suspects with lower WMC who are interviewed with cognitive load 
compared to interviewing under no cognitive load.  
Hypothesis 2H: In keeping with the literature regarding the abilities of lie detectors to use 
reliable cues to deception (e.g. Hartwig & Bond, 2011), there will be an effect for cues to 
cognitive load on ratings of cognitive load, ratings of deception, and accuracy. Those judging 
suspects who exhibit more cues to cognitive load will have higher ratings of cognitive load, 





Participants were randomly assigned to make either implicit or explicit judgments. Of the 
352 participants, 52% were ultimately assigned to make explicit judgments and 48% were 
assigned to make implicit judgments. Collapsing across judgment type, 33.5% judged suspects 
interview with normal order, 33.0% judged suspects interviewed with reverse order, and 33.5% 
judged suspects interviewed with dual task. In regards to final judgments type, 33.5% judged 
suspects who were telling the truth, 32.7% judged those telling a truthful lie, and 33.8% judged 
those telling an event lie. In terms of the pattern of final judgments, participants were more likely 
to decide in favor of suspects telling the truth, 60%. A binomial test indicated this was 
significantly higher than 50%, p ≤.001, indicating a truth bias. The average rating for the 
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deception scale was 4.85 (SD = 2.46), and that for the load scale was 5.07 (SD = 2.61). The 
distributions of means for cognitive load ratings and deception ratings are presented in Tables 24 
and 25 respectively. In regards to accuracy, overall accuracy was low: 40%, with an overall 
mean accuracy rating of 5.03 (SD = 2.52). The distributions of means for accuracy are present in 
Table 26.  
Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis 2A was examined using an independent samples t-test. Hypotheses 2B 
through 2H were examined in an ANOVA. In these analyses, the predictor variables of interview 
style, veracity, WMC, and their interaction terms were entered into the model. The final 
hypothesis 2I was examined using a multiple regression in which all of the cognitive load 
variables of details, contextual embeddings, cognitive operations, speech errors, speech fillers, 
speech rate, response delay, blinks, illustrators, hand/arm movements, and leg/foot movements 
were entered into the model.  
Hypothesis 2A: An independent samples t-test demonstrated no differences in decision making 
accuracy, t (348) = .50, p = .62, d = .06, for those who made implicit cognitive load judgments 
(M = 4.96, SD = 2.39), compared to those who made explicit deception judgments (M = 5.10, SD 
= 2.64).  
Hypothesis 2B: There was no effect of veracity on either ratings of cognitive load, F (2, 332) = 
.81, p = .44, η
2
 = .004, or ratings of deception, F (2, 333) = .35, p = .71, η
2
 = .002. There was an 
effect of veracity on accuracy of decision making, F (2, 332) = 3.53, p = .03, η
2
 = .02. Accuracy 
was higher for those judging suspects who told the truth compared to those who told a temporal 
lie, Mdiff = 1.14, p = 002, or an event lie, Mdiff = 1.02, p = .01. 
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Hypothesis 2C: There was no effect of interview style on deception ratings, F (2, 333) = .27, p = 
.76, η
2
 = .002. However there was effect of interview style on load ratings, F (2, 332) = 4.99, p = 
.01, η
2
 = .02, where the ratings of cognitive load were lower for judging normal order interviews 
compared to judging those interviewed with reverse order, Mdiff = -1.17, p = .002, and dual task, 
Mdiff = -1.26, p = .001. There was no effect of interview style on accuracy of decision making, F 
(2, 332) = .54, p = .58, η
2
 = .003 (see Table 24).  
Hypothesis 2D: There was no interaction effect between veracity and interview style on ratings 
of cognitive load, F (2, 332) = .48, p = .75, η
2
 = .001, or ratings of deception, F (2, 333) = .32, p 
= .87, η
2
 = .004. There was no interaction effect between veracity and interview style on 
accuracy of decision making, F (4, 332) = .33, p = .86, η
2
 = .001. 
Hypothesis 2E: There was no interaction effect between WMC and veracity on ratings of 
cognitive load, F (2, 332) = .14, p = .87, η
2
 = .001, or ratings of deception, F (2, 333) = .09, p = 
.92, η
2
 = .001. There was no interaction effect between WMC and veracity on accuracy of 
decision making, F (2, 332) = .68, p = .51, η
2
 = .0001. 
Hypothesis 2F: There was no significant interaction effect between WMC and interview style 
on ratings of cognitive load, F (2, 332) = .91, p = .40, η
2
 = .005, or ratings of deception, F (2, 
333) = .01, p = .99, η
2
 = .0001. There was a significant interaction effect between WMC and 
interview style on accuracy of decision making, F (2, 332) = 3.71, p = .03, η
2
 = .02. The 
relationship between WMC and accuracy is positive for those interviewed with normal order and 
reverse order, but negative for those interviewed with dual task (see Figure 12). 
Hypothesis 2G: There was no significant three-way interaction of WMC, veracity, and interview 
style on either ratings of cognitive load, F (2, 332) = 1.45, p = .22, η
2
 = .02, or ratings of 
deception, F (2, 333) = .96, p = .43, η
2
 = .01. There was no significant three-way interaction of 
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Hypothesis 2H: The overall regression model for the effect of the cues to cognitive load on 
ratings of cognitive load was significant, F (11, 284) = 3.05, p = .001, R
2
 = .11. Two of the cues 
to cognitive load were associated with ratings of cognitive load (see Table 27). Speech rate was 
negatively associated with ratings of cognitive load, β = -.17, t = -2.80, p = .01, where the faster 
the speech rate, the lower the ratings of cognitive load. Response delay was positively associated 
with ratings of cognitive load, β = .12, t = 2.07, p = .04, where the longer the response delay, the 
higher the ratings of cognitive load. There was also a borderline positive relationship between 
foot/leg movements and ratings of cognitive load, β = .11, t = 1.86, p = .06, where the more 
foot/leg movements exhibited, the higher the ratings of cognitive load.  
The regression model for the effect of cues to cognitive load on ratings of deception was 
not significant, F (11, 284) = .70, p = .74, R
2
 = .03. There was only one significant relationship 
between cues of cognitive load and ratings of deception (see Table 27). Speech rate was 
negatively associated with ratings of deception, β = -.12, t = -1.98, p = .05, where the faster the 
speech rate the lower the ratings of deception. The regression model for the effect of cues to 
cognitive load on final decision making accuracy was not significant, F (11, 283) = .44, p = .94, 
R
2
 = .02. There were no significant effects for any of the cues to cognitive load on accuracy of 
decision making (see Table 27). However, there was an effect bordering on significance for the 
number of details present in the interview, β = .16, t = 1.84, p = .07, where those suspects who 
gave more details were more likely be judged accurately.  
Discussion 
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 The purpose of Study 2 was to examine how the variables of Study 1, as well as the cues 
to cognitive load produced in Study 1, affected observers’ perceptions of suspects’ deception and 
cognitive load, as well as their accuracy in judging deception (either directly or indirectly). As 
with Study 1, the pattern of results provides only limited support for the hypotheses. First, 
regarding the decision type that observers made, there was no support for the advantage of 
making a judgment about cognitive load (an implicit lie judgment) compared to making a 
judgment about deception (an explicit lie judgment). This is not entirely out of line with the 
literature as at least one study to examine implicit measures of cognitive load (e.g. thinking hard) 
did not find any effect on lie detection accuracy compared to the direct method of assessing 
deception (Klaver et al., 2009).  
Regarding the effects of the independent variables of Study 1, there were some effects 
observed for veracity. Observers were more accurate in judging truthful suspects compared to 
deceptive suspects, supporting the prediction made by the hypothesis. However, this could be a 
function of the truth bias exhibited by the participants, which is typical of lay lie detectors (Vrij, 
2008). Likewise, there was no effect of veracity on the ratings of cognitive load or deception, 
indicating that the actual veracity of the participant did not seem to affect how truthful or under 
how much load a person appeared.  
 There was also an observed effect of interview style on observers’ ratings of cognitive 
load. As expected, those interviewed under cognitive load were rated as experiencing more 
cognitive load than those interviewed with normal order. However, contrary to expectations, 
there was no effect of interview style on ratings of deception or accuracy.  
For the interaction of veracity and interview style, there were no effects on observers’ 
decision making accuracy or ratings of deception or cognitive load. Likewise there was no 
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interaction effect for WMC and veracity on the outcome variables. There was, however, an effect 
for the interaction of WMC and interview style on accuracy in observers’ decision making. In 
this regard, the relationship between WMC and accuracy was positive for the interview styles of 
reverse and normal order, but negative for dual task. Depending on the interview style, the WMC 
affected the accuracy of decision making, where participants’ accuracy increased with WMC 
scores for suspects interviewed with normal or reverse order, but decreased for those interviewed 
with dual task. This is not quite as expected. The hypothesis predicted that the relationships 
would be positive for all interview types but stronger for the interview styles that involved more 
cognitive load. However these findings do indicate that the WMC of suspects to some degree 
affected the decision making of the observers. With regards to the three-way interaction of 
interview style, veracity, and WMC, there were no observed effects.  
Finally, there were few observed effects on decision making and accuracy with regards to 
the actual cues to cognitive load that were produced in Study 1. The factor of speech rate was 
associated with ratings of deception, where the faster the speech rate, the lower the rating of 
deception. This is in keeping with the prediction as a faster speech rate is an indication of less 
cognitive load, and thus presumably truth telling. The variables of speech rate and response delay 
were associated with participants’ ratings of cognitive load, both in the manner expected. The 
slower the speech rate (higher cognitive load) and the longer the response delay (higher cognitive 
load), the higher the rating of cognitive load given. In addition, there was a borderline effect for 
foot/leg movements, where the fewer foot/leg movements (higher cognitive load), the higher the 
rating of cognitive load. There was some limited support for the hypothesis that cues to cognitive 
load would improve accuracy, in that there was a borderline-significant effect for statement 
details.  
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 Overall the pattern of results suggests that none of the cues or conditions of Study 1 
systematically affected the judgment accuracy of the lie detector participants of Study 2. It 
appears that the main factor driving judgment accuracy was a high truth bias, which would 
explain the findings regarding the advantage for judging truthful participants. However this 
postulation does not entirely explain the all of the findings.  
Limitations 
 There is one limitation in the current study that may explain some of the findings. It may 
be that the cues were too weak to be noticed by the participants, which as previously discussed, 
was a result of the limitations of Study 1. This would explain why there were so few effects on 
accuracy, but it would not explain why there were effects on ratings of cognitive load. Several 
variables were associated with ratings of cognitive load, suggesting that they were in some way 
noticeable to participants. There were no effects on accuracy, but again it does not appear that 
this was due to weakness in the stimulus materials. Future research could address this limitation 
by providing stronger stimulus materials for observers.  
General Discussion 
Study 1  
 The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the effects of cognitive load induced during a 
mock investigative interview and to determine how this was moderated by the suspect’s WMC. I 
induced cognitive load in two forensically relevant manners, that of the types of statements made 
by the suspects and the manner in which the suspects were interviewed. This was done for two 
reasons. Cognitive load was induced in order to account for the naturally occurring difficulty that 
may occur when telling a lie (compared to telling the truth), and to see how these statements 
were affected by the extra cognitive load added through a difficult interview style (compared to 
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typical normal order interviewing). I predicted that increasing the cognitive load, both in the 
form of veracity and interview style, would increase the difficulty experienced by the suspects. 
As the suspects experienced more cognitive difficulty, they would exhibit more observable cues 
to cognitive load. I also predicted that suspects’ WMC would moderate this process. For suspects 
with lower WMC, the relationship between cognitive difficulty and the cues to cognitive load 
they exhibited would be strongly related. As suspects’ WMC increased, this relationship would 
become relatively weaker.  
 Examining the overall pattern of results, these predictions were not supported. The 
cognitive load supposedly induced by veracity seemed to have no effect on suspects’ exhibited 
cues to cognitive load. WMC did not clearly and consistently moderate the cues to cognitive load 
observed. There was some effect on cues to cognitive load produced by interview style, but this 
overall pattern seemed to be that the reverse order interview condition served to provide a 
cognitive boost to suspects.   
The finding of no effect for veracity is still an important finding nonetheless as it 
demonstrates that perhaps not all lies are so cognitively demanding that they will appear different 
from the truth. In a real world, non-laboratory setting, one does not have much control over the 
ways in which people will lie. Liars will most likely try to optimize telling lies that will be most 
advantageous to them, both in terms of being plausible and believable, as well as being 
cognitively easier to cope with (e.g. relying as much as possible on truthful memory). If this is 
the case, then lies may not always appear so cognitively different from each other, as was 
demonstrated in the current study. It seems in general that people are well practiced at telling lies 
(DePaulo et al., 1996), and so too perhaps this general practice of lying may make lying less 
cognitively demanding. Indeed, more practiced tasks take up less cognitive demand (Paas et al., 
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2003; Witchens, Hutchins, Carolan, & Cumming, 2013). Additionally, liars spend more time 
rehearsing and preparing their statements compared to truth tellers (Strömwall et al., 2006), thus 
those telling the truth may actually experience some increase in cognitive load compared to those 
telling a lie because the liars have already taken the time to rehearse the lie, which might reduce 
its cognitive demand. Thus while it seems that the research indicates that lying is overall more 
cognitively demanding than telling the truth, this may not always be the case. This might be 
important to recognize when attempting to apply the cognitive load technique to real world 
settings as this technique may reduce the reliability and accuracy of decision making.  
It is also important to consider the interesting findings surrounding the reverse order 
interview condition. In some circumstances, being interviewed with cognitive load is associated 
with an advantage; in other cases it is carries a disadvantage, depending on the condition of 
veracity. Those telling a lie and interviewed with reverse order exhibited fewer cues to load than 
those telling the truth. There does not seem to be a clear explanation in the literature for why this 
would be. Vrij et al. (2008) found that reverse order interviewing led to more cues to cognitive 
load being exhibited, and that this effect was increased for liars compared to truth tellers. 
Perhaps reverse order is not a purely cognitive manipulation, but is also affecting some other 
aspect of the deception process. Perhaps for those telling the truth, the reverse order process 
forces them to think about their statements in a new way, such as giving deeper consideration to 
the order of events, thus increasing the cognitive load of honesty. Thus it seems that for telling 
the truth, reverse order does not provide any cognitive buffers, but rather actually induces more 
cognitive load. Liars on the other hand may have already memorized the order of their lies, and 
so it is just a simple process to reverse it. However this does not entirely explain why truth tellers 
would not then appear similarly to liars, but rather appear to be under more cognitive load than 
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liars. It appears that reverse order is in some way lessening the cognitive load of liars. This effect 
cannot be easily explained by the specific processes of this particular study either, as in regards 
to the reverse order and normal order conditions, these were followed exactly as described in 
Vrij et al. (2008).  
 As for the moderating effect of WMC, this could be explained by the fact that neither 
veracity nor interview style seemed to affect cognitive load in the manner predicted. If cognitive 
load was not being strongly affected, then there is not much room for WMC to explain the 
relationship. However, this does not entirely explain the pattern of results observed regarding 
WMC. There were some effects of WMC, but they were rather weak and were often not in the 
direction predicted.  
Study 2 
The goal of this study was to examine in what way the factors of Study 1 impacted 
judgments of lie detectors and the accuracy of those judgments. This was done in order to 
determine to what degree the cues to cognitive load translated into cues that observers could use 
to detect deception, and to determine if an implicit measure of cognitive load might be a better 
decision making aid than explicit measure of deception. This study does not offer much support 
for the cognitive nature of deception or the reliance on the cognitive load method of lie detection 
(Vrij et al., 2011).  
What is more interesting is the discrepancy between the variables that affected the 
judgments of the participants and the accuracy of those decisions. None of the variables had any 
effect on ratings of deception, but several variables did affect the ratings of cognitive load. This 
indicates that veracity is not something that can be readily seen, yet cognitive load to some 
degree can be. Previous research indicates that directly observing deception is difficult (e.g. 
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Bond & DePaulo, 2006), which is again likely due to the fact that there are few reliable cues to 
deception (e.g. DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Cues to cognitive load though 
might be more easily observable because there is less motivation on the part of people to disguise 
when they are thinking hard. For example, there are not so many strong consequences associated 
with thinking hard compared to deception (e.g. incarceration, social stigma). It may also be the 
case that cognitive load has a greater impact on observable behavioral cues than does deception. 
If indeed deception is not always so cognitively difficult, perhaps the effects of deception are 
easier to mask than those of difficult cognition. However, even while cues to cognitive load 
might be more easily observable than cues to deception, neither type of cue was associated more 
accurate judgments. This indicates that these cues to cognitive load are not necessarily also cues 
to deception.  
Future Directions 
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 overall give the same take-home message that deception 
does not always induce more cognitive load than telling the truth and that cues to cognitive load 
cannot always be relied upon as cues to deception. The findings of these studies raise many 
questions for future research to address. First of all, the results of these studies are not in keeping 
with previously published research (e.g. Vrij et al., 2008; 2010), even though they are very 
strongly based in the methodology of Vrij et al., (2008). However, some research has questioned 
the benefit to using the cognitive load approach to lie detection (e.g. Blandόn-Gitlin, Fenn, 
Masip, & Yoo, 2014; Lane, Martin, & Mennie, 2014). Blandόn-Gitlin et al. (2014) posited that 
the use of cognitive load might overburden truth tellers and make them appear more deceptive, 
and indeed this has been found to be the case (Cheng and Broadhurst, 2005; Lane et al., 2014). 
Though this was not the case in the current study, it still adds weight to the idea that further 
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research should be conducted regarding the cognitive load approach to lie detection. In some 
circumstances it appears to be very beneficial (e.g. Vrij et al., 2008), and in others potentially 
misleading (e.g. Lane et al., 2014).  
Future research should also be conducted regarding the process of deception itself. I 
attempted to examine different types of lies that were designed to be cognitively more or less 
difficult. These lies, though apparently different in their level of difficulty, did not seem to 
function very differently from one another, and furthermore seemed to be relatively easy to tell 
(when compared to those telling the truth). It seems that lying, while it may be a cognitive 
process, is a unique one that should be further understood. It may be that there are other 
resources that people may rely on when formulating and executing lies that allow lie to be easier 
to tell. By better understanding the process of deception, better opportunities for exploiting that 
process may be discovered. 
Conclusions 
 Overall the hypotheses of these research studies did not support the predictions that I 
made. However the findings of this study are not unimportant, or entirely explained by 
limitations in the methodology. This research adds to the body of knowledge regarding the 
cognitive nature of deception, in that deception does not seem to be cognitively demanding—or 
perhaps that telling the truth is more cognitively demanding than generally thought. This 
research further indicates that caution should be taken when using the cognitive load approach to 
lie detection; rather the cognitive nature of deception should be better understood before 
employing such measures in the field.  
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Figure 1. Predicted relationship veracity between cues to cognitive load and WMC with normal 
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Figure 2. Predicted relationship veracity between cues to cognitive load and WMC with reverse 
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β = .27 (SE = .02), t = 3.47, p = .001 
β = .00 (SE = .02), t = .004, p = .99 
β = .05 (SE = .02), t = .57, p = .57 
THIRD DOCTORAL EXAMINATION                                                                                    67 
 
Figure 6. Regression slopes for WMC for each veracity type for only the normal order interview 









β = .08 (SE = .06), t = .56, p = .58 
β = -.15 (SE = .08), t = -1.04, p = .30 
β = .05 (SE = .08), t = .36, p = .72 
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Figure 7. Regression slopes for WMC for each veracity type for only the dual task interview type 










β = .22 (SE = .07), t = 1.61, p = .11 
β = .11 (SE = .08), t = .80, p = .43 
β = -.23 (SE = .09), t = -1.63, p = .11 
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Figure 8. Regression slopes for WMC for each veracity type for only the reverse order interview 









β = -.17 (SE = .08), t = -1.22, p = .23 
β = -.38 (SE = .16), t = -2.76, p = .01 
β = .16 (SE = .15), t = 1.16, p = .25 
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Figure 9. Regression slopes for WMC for each veracity type for only the normal order interview 








β = .28 (SE = .04), t = 2.14, p = .04 
β = -.12 (SE = .07), t = -.81, p = .42 
β = .20 (SE = .05), t = 1.44, p = .16 
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Figure 10. Regression slopes for WMC for each veracity type for only the reverse order 









β = .29 (SE = .06), t = 2.13, p = .04 
β = .16 (SE = .06), t = 1.15, p = .26 
β = -.22 (SE = .05), t = -1.58, p = .12 
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Figure 11. Regression slopes for WMC for each veracity type for only the dual task interview 







β = .14 (SE = .05), t = .99, p = .33 
β = .06 (SE = .05), t = .42, p = .68 
β = .16 (SE = .04), t = 1.17, p = .25 
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β = -.17 (SE = .01), t = -1.85, p = .07 
β = .09 (SE = .01), t = 1.02, p = .31 
β = .23 (SE = .01), t = 2.49, p = .01 
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Table 1. Interrater reliability correlations for cues
4











Total length of the interview 
 
.99 
Total length of response .99 
Response delay .99 
Speech rate .99 
Blinks .93 
Illustrators .98 
Hand/arm movements .87 
Food/leg movements .92 
Statement details .96 
Statement contextual embeddings .95 
Statement cognitive operations .87 
Statement errors .90 
Statement fillers .95 
Dual task count .99 
Number of reverse order words .94 




                                                 
4
 These cues are described in Dependent Variables subsection of the Method section for Study 1. 
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                Telling the truth     
 N 53 54 53 160 










                Temporal deception     
 N 54 53 52 159 










                 Event deception     
 N 52 54 52 158 










      
Total N 159 161 157  










mean = 35.03 
(SD = 19.38) 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix for the cues to cognitive load observed in Study 1 
 



























    
 
































      
6 Speech  
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-.03 -.05 -.02 -.12
** 






































































THIRD DOCTORAL EXAMINATION                                                                                    77 
 













Statement contextual embeddings .11
*
 




Statement fillers .06 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 10.18 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 6.15 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 3.71 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 2.17 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 4.32 
(SD = 4.11) 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 2.47 
(SD = .62) 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 1.51 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 13.32 
(SD = 10.22) 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 10.76 
(SD = 11.49) 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 7.28 
(SD = 5.90) 
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                Telling the truth     










                Temporal deception     










                 Event deception     




















Overall Mean = 4.22 
(SD = 6.09) 
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Contextual Embeddings 7.90 .000 .03 
Cognitive Operations .08 .92 .0003 
Errors 4.61 .01 .02 
Fillers 3.95 .02 .02 
Speech Rate 2.40 .09 .01 
Response Delay 12.73 .000 .05 
Blinks .59 .56 .002 
Illustrators .29 .75 .001 
Hand/arm movements .02 .98 .0001 
Foot/leg movements 
 
.28 .76 .01 
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Contextual Embeddings 1.12 .33 .004 
Cognitive Operations .04 .96 .0002 
Errors .68 .51 .003 
Fillers 1.65 .19 .01 
Speech Rate .08 .92 .0003 
Response Delay 1.09 .34 .004 
Blinks 2.82 .06 .01 
Illustrators 1.75 .18 .01 
Hand/arm movements .72 .49 .003 
Foot/leg movements 
 
.54 .59 .001 
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Contextual Embeddings .22 .93 .002 
Cognitive Operations .60 .66 .01 
Errors .64 .64 .01 
Fillers .60 .67 .005 
Speech Rate .78 .54 .01 
Response Delay .81 .52 .01 
Blinks 1.93 .10 .02 
Illustrators .14 .97 .001 
Hand/arm movements 2.63 .03 .02 
Foot/leg movements 
 
.82 .52 .01 
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Contextual Embeddings .65 .52 .002 
Cognitive Operations .08 .93 .0003 
Errors 1.34 .26 .01 
Fillers 1.48 .23 .01 
Speech Rate .19 .83 .001 
Response Delay .56 .57 .002 
Blinks .64 .53 .003 
Illustrators 1.21 .30 .01 
Hand/arm movements .06 .95 .0002 
Foot/leg movements 
 
.79 .46 .03 
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Contextual Embeddings 4.78 .01 .02 
Cognitive Operations 1.20 .30 .01 
Errors .27 .77 .001 
Fillers .07 .93 .0003 
Speech Rate .22 .80 .001 
Response Delay 1.27 .28 .005 
Blinks .59 .55 .002 
Illustrators .94 .39 .004 
Hand/arm movements .50 .61 .002 
Foot/leg movements 
 
.02 .98 .0001 
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Contextual Embeddings .55 .70 .004 
Cognitive Operations .88 .47 .01 
Errors 1.01 .40 .01 
Fillers 1.08 .37 .01 
Speech Rate .59 .67 .005 
Response Delay .63 .64 .005 
Blinks 3.34 .01 .03 
Illustrators .42 .80 .004 
Hand/arm movements 2.79 .03 .02 
Foot/leg movements 
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Contextual embeddings .79 -.07 
Cognitive operations .69 -.10 
Errors .78 .09 
Fillers .71 .21 
Response delay -.08 .62 
Speech rate -.02 -.77 
Blinks .68 .12 
Illustrators .74 -.19 
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Table 23. Full ANCOVA models for the outcome factors of general cognitive load and taking 





















   Veracity 3.66 (2) .03 .01 
   Interview Style 5.69 (2) .004 .02 
   Veracity x Interview Style .29 (4) .88 .002 
   WMC x Veracity .62 (2) .54 .002 
   WMC x Interview Style .26 (2) .77 .001 
   WMC x Veracity x Interview Style 
 
.27 (4) .90 .002 
Taking time to think    
   Veracity .002 .99 .00001 
   Interview Style 8.55 .000 .03 
   Veracity x Interview Style .48 .75 .004 
   WMC x Veracity .45 .64 .002 
   WMC x Interview Style .95 .39 .004 
   WMC x Veracity x Interview Style 
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Telling the truth 4.95 (2.52) 5.25 (2.57)
 
6.26 (2.56) 5.48 (2.59) 
     
Temporal deception 3.68 (2.12) 5.67 (2.92) 5.25 (2.75) 4.86 (2.73) 
     
Event deception 4.24 (2.40) 5.26 (2.24) 5.13 (2.68) 4.87 (2.47) 
      
Total  4.30 (2.39) 5.39 (2.57) 5.53 (2.69) Overall Total:  
5.07 (2.61) 
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Telling the truth 5.03 (2.55) 5.25 (2.57)
 
6.26 (2.56) 4.97 (2.52) 
     
Temporal deception 4.63 (2.42) 5.67 (2.92) 5.25 (2.75) 4.68 (2.41) 
     
Event deception 4.78 (2.63) 5.26 (2.24) 5.18 (2.31) 4.91 (2.47) 
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Telling the truth 5.72 (2.57) 6.23 (2.83)
 
5.45 (2.49) 5.80 (2.64) 
     
Temporal deception 4.42 (2.29) 4.25 (2.41) 5.00 (2.38) 4.57 (2.36) 
     
Event deception 4.46 (2.45) 4.71 (2.26) 5.00 (2.47) 4.72 (2.39) 
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Cue to cognitive load 
 
 















































Contextual embeddings .12 1.57 .12 -.06 .-.81 .42 -.12 -1.60 .11 
Cognitive operations .01 .07 .94 -.01 -.08 .94 -.08 -1.08 .28 
Errors .02 .26 .79 -.03 -.42 .68 .04 .52 .60 
Fillers .03 .52 .61 .06 .82 .41 -.04 -.63 .53 
Speech rate -.17 -2.80 .01 -.12 -1.98 .05 -.04 -.60 .55 
Response delay .12 2.07 .04 -.02 -.35 .73 .01 .16 .87 
Blinks -.06 -.97 .33 -.02 -.28 .78 -.003 -.05 .96 
Illustrators .08 1.12 .27 -.07 .85 .40 .01 .16 .87 
Hand/arm movements -.01 -.11 .92 -.01 -.11 .91 .02 .38 .70 
Foot/leg movements 
 
.11 1.86 .06 .05 .83 .41 .04 .60 .55 
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